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   This thesis attempts to analyse and explain the reason why Egypt and Tunisia 
experienced different transitional outcomes following the Arab uprisings in 2011. Although 
both countries appear to have similar authoritarian regimes, Tunisia experienced a democratic 
transition while Egypt reverted back to an authoritarian regime. The thesis applies the 
framework of new institutionalism and rational choice theory in an attempt to explain both 
structural, and actor-oriented factors that might have contributed to Egypt and Tunisia´s 
different outcomes. In order to investigate this puzzle, the thesis is based upon the following 
research question:  
“Why did Tunisia result in democratization following the Arab uprisings while Egypt did not, 
when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?”  
From the theoretical framework thesis has developed three distinct hypotheses. The 
first two hypotheses are developed from the new institutional approach, and focuses on 
structural explanations. The third hypothesis is developed from the rational choice approach, 
and focuses on actor-oriented explanations. In order to explore the hypotheses, the thesis 
utilizes the strategy of comparative historical analysis and process tracing.   
The findings indicate that the different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia mainly lie in 
influence of the military in relation to the state apparatus. In Egypt, the military and the state 
apparatus were not autonomous from each other, and instead fused together. As a result of the 
lack of autonomy between these institutions, a democratic transition has become impossible.  
By contrast, in Tunisia, the military and state apparatus were autonomous from each other, 
which in return encouraged a democratic transition. Hence, the autonomy between the state 
apparatus and the military appears to have been a crucial factor that promotes democratic 
transitions, whereas a lack of autonomy between these institutions appears to disrupt 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
For much of the past four decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have 
been characterized by an astonishing persistence of authoritarianism. In fact, no other place in 
the world has turned out to be so immune to democratization as the MENA countries. In 2010 
the advocacy organization, Freedom House released their annual report on the state of 
political and civil rights around the world, and reported that the MENA remained the region 
with the lowest level of freedom (Freedom House, 2011). The failure of democratization to 
take root in the region and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world has puzzled 
scholars. The authoritarian persistence that characterized MENA changed in the course of a 
few weeks in late 2010 and early 2011.  
On the 17th of December 2010 a Tunisian street vendor, named Mohamed Bouazizi, 
set himself on fire in front of his local government building in Sidi Bouzid, a rural town in 
Tunisia. Earlier that day, a policewoman seized his vegetable cart and publicly humiliated 
him. He attempted to lodge a complaint at the local municipality but this was of no use 
(Gelvin, 2012:27). Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest against the injust social and political 
conditions dominating the country. Mohamed Bouazizi died of his injuries on the 4th of 
January 2011. However, his death, set off an increasing series of protests against the 
government that spread across Tunisia.  The 14th of January 2011, President Zine el-Abidine 
Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia unchallenged for the previous twenty-three years, fled the 
country. Ben Ali´s overtrow sett off a wave of anti-authoritarian mobilization in the region 
known as the Arab uprisings (Brynen, Moore, Salloukh and Zahar, 2012:17). 
The uprisings in Tunisia was the first in a series of events that made a powerful 
impression on ordinary people in the region, and as a result it spread like wild fire to its 
neighboring countries. The events that took place in Tunisia demonstrated that broad based 
movements such as the one that overthrew the Tunisian government was both powerfull and 
effective. Subsequently, activists in Egypt began to occupy Tahir square in Cairo on the 25th 
of January 2011. (Brynen et al., 2012:24). The demonstrations in Cairo grew much larger than 
anticipated, and spread across the country. Tahir square became the gathering place for the 
opposition despite the regime´s efforts to intimidate them. The security forces in Egypt failed 
to unravel the protesters and the military refused to open fire on them. On the 11th of February 





Whereas Ben Ali and Mubarak´s regime eventually gave in to the revolution, the next 
wave of challenged leaders fought back. On the one hand, in some countries like Morocco, 
the leaders offered limited preventive political concessions, while on the other, wealthy 
countries such as Saudi Arabia combined repression as well as extensive public spending. 
Other countries responded to peacefull demonstrations with brutal force. Muammar Quaddafi 
the authoritarian leader in Libya unleashed the full force of his army on peaceful protesters. 
The al-Khalifa dynasty in Bahrain started an efficient elimination of their political opponents. 
The president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, refused to let go of his power when nearly every 
sector in society as well as the military turned against him. Finally the protestors in Syria 
were brutally repressed (Lynch, 2014:1-2).  
 
1.1 The Puzzle  
The political landscape of the Arab world experienced its most dramatic transformation in 
half a century following the Arab uprisings (Heydemann and Leenders, 2011:647). The 
aftermath of the Arab uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia consisted of political change, and a 
renewal of party politics. In January 2014, after two interim governments as well as over two 
years of debate, Tunisia finally approved a new constitution. Egypt, on the other hand, 
experienced a military coup in July 2013, which ultimately removed the democratically 
elected Islamic opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood from power (Battera, 2014:545). 
What can explain these different outcomes? Why did Tunisia successfully transition to a 
democracy while Egypt reverted back to a authoritarian regime?  
At first glace, Egypt and Tunisia share common traits that make their variations following 
the uprising puzzling. Firstly, Egypt and Tunisia are for instance two religiously homogenous 
countries. Roughly ninety-eight percent of the population in Tunisia and ninety percent of the 
population in Egypt are Sunni Arab (Gelvin, 2012:35). Secondly, Egypt and Tunisia both 
share a history of state-building that stretches back to the nineteenth century and both 
countries are republics (Gelvin, 2012:36; Battera, 2014:545). Thirdly, neither Egypt nor 
Tunisia were rentier states  (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987:61). Finally, and most importantly, 
both countries have shown to various degrees, an interrelationship between the pillars of 
power, namely, the state, the party in power and the military (Battera, 2014:545).  




Arab uprisings even more puzzling. What can explain their different outcome, given their 
similar outset? 
Subsequently, the research question I intend to answer is the following:  
Why did Tunisia result in democratization following the Arab uprisings while Egypt did not, 
when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?  
As will become clear in chapter 2, I believe that the key to understanding the different 
outcomes between Tunisia and Egypt, following the Arab uprisings lies in the relationship 
between the state apparatus and the military. The state apparatus includes the state and the 
party, and is considered the pillars of power together with the military within an authoritarian 
regime. Thus, by describing differences in Egypt and Tunisia from when the authoritarian 
regimes were founded, until a new regime was established after the revolutions, this thesis 
attempts to explain their different outcomes. The authoritarian regime in Egypt was 
established in 1952 whereas in Tunisia it was established in 1957. The research question in 
this study is addressed through three hypotheses, which have been developed from the 
theoretical framework in chapter 2, and consists of the new institutional approach and rational 
choice theory. The hypotheses that will be explored throughout this thesis are the following: 
First, the more autonomous the state apparatus and the military are from each other in an 
authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization. Second, the more the state 
apparatus and the military are willing to compromise with each other after a revolution, the 
higher the probability of democratization.  Third, the more divided the state apparatus and the 
military are during a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization. The method 
used to carry out the research at hand is qualitatively oriented, and the research strategy 
utilized is comparative historical analysis, and process tracing.  
 
1.2 Why is this Research Important?    
The research at hand is important for several reasons. First and foremost, the study of 
democratization is important. Many scholars have attempted to explain the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the Middle East. Scholars have viewed the region as exceptionally and 
culturally resistant to democratization (Hinnebusch, 2006:374). However, following the Arab 




today. The Arab uprisings not only destabilized robust authoritarian regimes but also the 
findings of a sophisticated literature that developed over the previous decade to explain 
resilience of authoritarian arab states (Lynch, 2014:5). As such, it is important to continue to 
develop research on democratization and the Middle East. The Arab uprisings, and 
particularly the internal variation within the region suggests the importance of developing 
new research aimed at democratization prospects in the Middle East (Bellin, 2012:127). New 
theoretical insights as well as new empirical realities are needed to mirror the dynamics of  
current authoritarian regimes.  
Second, studies on transition from authoritarian rule have demonstrated that militaries 
play a critical role in authoritarian breakdowns (Lee, 2009:640). Subsequently, how the Arab 
militaries responded to the uprsings is an important aspect to investigate as it is crucial to 
understanding the regimes different outcomes. Moreover, the political science literature is ill-
equipped solve this particular puzzle (Springborg, 2014:142).  Ever since Gamal Abdel and 
the Free Officers came to power in Egypt in 1952 following a military coup, the MENA 
region became an important avenue of research for civil-military relations. However, as 
military rule persisted, researchers on the Arab region increasingly ignored the military 
institution as a subject of study (Springborg, 2014:142). This was partly because research 
accces became progressively more difficult to obtain and the militaries role in politics were 
hiden from view (Norton, 2013:338). Therefore, I consider this study to be an important 
component into understanding the variations between the Arab militaries, which will shed 
light on their particular role in the different outcomes of the uprisings.    
 
1.3 The Structural Outline of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, chapter 2 consist of a brief presentation of core concepts 
related to the thesis, which are: authoritarian regimes, revolutions, transitions, 
democratization and liberalization. Moreover, this chapter also presents the theoretical 
framework outlined for the thesis. The theoretical framework consists of two theoretical 
approaches, namely, new institutionalism and rational choice theory.  The final section of this 
chapter presents the hypotheses developed from the theoretical framework, which is intended 
to answer the research question.  
Chapter 3 presents and elaborates upon the research design that has been selected for 




tracing. This chapter also touches upon methodological challenges, case selection, data source 
material, and justifies methodological choices.  
Chapter 4 consists of a brief historical overview of Egypt and Tunisia. It will serve as 
both an introduction, and provide the reader with the context and background relevant for the 
research at hand.    
Chapter 5 consists of the empirical analysis. In this chapter, each of the hypotheses 
presented in chapter 2 is systematically analysed through causal process observations (CPOs), 
which are diagnostic pieces of evidence that are examined through process tracing. 
Chapter 6 discusses the main findings from the empirical analysis, which are summed 
up and presented in a table. This chapter also discusses the findings in relation to the 
theoretical framework presented in chapter 2.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the main findings. This chapter also provides suggestions for 
future research on this topic, and discuss the limitations and implications of the conducted 


















Chapter 2: The Theoretical Framework 
The first section of this chapter defines essential concepts that are relevant for the 
research at hand and for the theories applied in this study. Furthermore, this thesis 
concentrates on two theoretical approaches, namely, the new institutional approach and the 
rational choice approach. Subsequently, the second section of the theoretical chapter discusses 
the new institutional approach and the third section discusses the rational choice theory. The 
new institutional approach focuses on how institutions interact and affect society while 
rational choice theory focuses on understanding the behaviour of actors. Moreover, together 
these two approaches will constitute the theoretical framework of this thesis. The new 
institutional approach will provide insight into institutions in authoritarian regimes while the 
rational choice approach will highlight the interactions between the ruling elite in 
authoritarian regimes. The latter approach also helps to demonstrate why democratic 
transitions are either avoided or accepted at critical points when it results from elite 
calculations (Battera, 2014:547). Given that the theoretical framework consists of the new 
institutional approach and rational choice theory, the focus of this thesis is primary on internal 
factors within authoritarian regimes that can explain Egypt and Tunisia´s different outcomes. 
Previous research has emphasised the importance of external factors, which serve as an 
important tool for authoritarian resilience in the Arab world, however, for the purposes of this 
thesis I have deemed it more fruitful to focus on internal factors alone, as these have proved 
strong enough to resist change (Battera, 2014:546-47). 
 
2.1 Definitions 
In this section I will present concepts that are central to the research question, and that 
will be mentioned considerably throughout this thesis. The following concepts will be 
clarified and further elaborated upon: authoritarian regimes, social revolution, transition, 
democratization and liberalization. Authoritarian regimes are an important concept to consider 
here, as the cases that are investigated were both authoritarian in nature prior to the uprisings 
in 2011. Social revolutions are equally as important to consider since this is the main 
phenomenon under investigation, more specifically I am investigating the different outcomes 
of the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia. This is also the case for the concept of transitions as I 




transitioned back to an authoritarian regime. Finally, the concepts of democratization and 
liberalization are important to consider as this research attempts to understand the factors that 
leads to democratization following a revolution. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the two concepts, as liberalization does not automatically lead to democratization.  
 
2.1.1 Authoritarian Regimes 
Authoritarianism is often defined as a regime type in terms personnel, rules of the 
game, and the structure of the state (Pratt, 2007:5). Juan Linz defines authoritarian regimes as: 
“Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate 
and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive 
political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a 
leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits 
but actually quite predictable ones.” (1996:38) 
This definition was developed by Linz to contrast this regime type from democracies 
and totalitarian regimes. Hence, the definition suggests clear conceptual boundaries between 
democratic regimes and totalitarian regimes. Although authoritarian and totalitarian regimes 
are both non-democratic political systems, Linz argues that the former is distinguishable from 
the latter with regards to four key dimensions, which are limited pluralism, ideology, weak 
mobilization, and a partially constrained leadership (Linz, 1996:38-9).  
In order to study authoritarian regimes it is important to identify and classify various 
types of authoritarian regimes as they differ from each other as much as they differ from 
democratic ones (Geddes, 1999:121). Geddes classifies regimes as authoritarian if they are 
personalist, military, single-party or a combination of these. According to Geddes, single-
party regimes are characterized by one dominant party that controls the access to political 
office and the implementation of policy, other parties may, however, legally compete in 
elections. Military regimes on the other hand, consist of a group of officers that decides who 
will rule and have influence over policy. Personalist regimes are different from single-party 
regimes and military regimes, in that access to office, depend to a much higher degree on the 
discretion of an individual leader (1999:121). In this paper I will adopt Geddes classification 
of authoritarian regimes. Linz´s definition of authoritarian regimes and Geddes classification 




help us understand why similar authoritarian regimes such as Tunisia and Egypt had different 
outcomes following the Arab uprisings.   
 
2.1.2 Social Revolution 
Theda Skocpol, a pioneer within the field of revolutions, defines social revolutions 
(1979:4) as: “rapid, basic transformations of a society´s state and class structures; and they are 
accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from bellow”. Furthermore, 
she argues that social revolutions differ from rebellions and political revolutions. Rebellions 
can involve the revolt of subordinate classes, however, they do not lead to structural change. 
In contrast political revolutions, change state structures but not social structures, and are not 
automatically accomplished through class conflict (Skocpol, 1979:4). Skocpol (1979:5) 
argues that social revolutions differ from rebellions and political revolutions in “that basic 
changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing 
fashion. And these changes occur through intense socio-political conflicts in which class 
struggles play a key role.” 
As the Arab uprisings are the focal point of this thesis, I will use Theda Skocpol´s 
definition of social revolutions when referring to the Arab uprisings. As will be shown later 
throughout the thesis, the uprisings were essentially changes in both the social structure as 
well as the political structure, which occurred at the same time in a reinforcing way. In 
addition the Arab uprisings occurred through class-based protests from bellow.  
 
2.1.3 Transition  
A transition refers to “the interval between one political regime and another” 
(O´Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:6).  Transitions are delimited in that it launches a dissolution 
process of an authoritarian regime, by either establishing some form of democracy, or 
returning to authoritarian rule. A typical indication that a transition has started is when 
authoritarian incumbents start to change their own rules by providing more rights for 
individuals and groups. Thus, during a transition authoritarian incumbents tend to have 
control over the rules and procedures to the extent that they exist (O´Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986:6).  
The concept of transition is central to the research question, as both Egypt and Tunisia 




democracy whereas Egypt returned to an authoritarian regime. It is important to get a clear 
understanding of what is actually meant by a transition because as O´Donnell and Schmitter 
have demonstrated, transitions are not necessarily equivalent to democratization. Hence, a 
transition within an authoritarian regime does not automatically mean that the regime will 
become democratic as it can revert back to an authoritarian regime.  
 
2.1.4 Democratization versus Liberalization  
Democratization essentially refers to a shift or a transition from a non-democratic 
regime towards a democracy. In democracies, citizenship is at the centre, which involves the 
right to be treated as equals by others with respect to making collective choices and the 
obligation of those implementing these choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all 
members of the community (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:7). Democratization can be 
defined as:   
“[ …] the processes whereby the rulers and procedures of citizenship are either applied 
to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g., coercive control, 
social tradition, expert judgment, or administrative practice), or expanded to include 
persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g., nontax payers, 
illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or extended to cover 
issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g., state 
agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, 
productive enterprises, educational institutions, ect.) (O´Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986:8).  
Democratization is thus a process with a clear end result (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 
2004:375), more specifically that of a democracy.  
It is important to distinguish between democratization and liberalization, as these 
concepts are not the same. Liberalization refers to the process of redefining and extending 
rights (O´Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:7). In contrast to democratization, liberalization is not 
a process with a clear end result. Rulers in authoritarian regimes can accept or encourage 
liberalization through the assumption that by opening up some areas in society for individual 
and group action, this will diminish various pressures and give them access to required 
information and support without changing the authority structure (O´Donnell and Schmitter, 




democratization, as the regimes are able to target different areas in society that they want to 
liberalize. Therefore, whereas liberalization is targeted at specific areas within the state, 
democratization is a change towards the establishment of a democracy.  
As a reminder, the research question that this thesis attempts to answer is the 
following: “Why did Tunisia result in democratization following the Arab uprisings while 
Egypt did not, when they both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?” Subsequently, 
the section above has focused on key concepts utilized throughout this thesis. The concepts 
considered here are authoritarian regimes, social revolutions, transition, democratization and 
liberalization. In addition to having defined and clarified these concepts, they further relate to 
the theoretical framework. The institutions and actors examined are studied within the context 
of authoritarian regimes that has experienced social revolutions, and as a result either 
transitioned to democracy, thus experienced democratization, or transitioned back to 
authoritarian rule.   
 
2.2 The New Institutional Approach 
This section examines the new institutional approach by mainly focusing on 
sociological and historical institutionalism, which are two different strands within new 
institutionalism. Accordingly, this section is divided into five separate subsections. The first 
subsection looks at what an institution is, by defining and clarifying the concept. The second 
subsection discusses the differences between traditional institutionalism and new 
institutionalism. The third subsection presents the sociological approach to new 
institutionalism, whereas fourth subsection presents historical institutionalism. The fifth and 
final subsection will briefly discuss how the new institutional framework apply to 
authoritarian regimes, their durability, and democratization prospects in the Middle East, as is 
the main focus of this thesis.  
 
2.2.1. Institution and Institutionalization  
In political science, the new institutional approach can be distinguished from other 
leading approaches in the field such as behaviouralism, rational choice and structuralism in its 




lack of a clear conception of what institutions are, and how they can be defined (Keman, 
1997:1). Correspondingly, the literature on new institutionalism illustrates that there are 
opposing views on what an institution is and how to understand them. Lane and Ersson uses 
an analogy of a chess game as a model of human interaction to give a better understanding of 
what institutions are and their place in social and political life: 
“In chess, people interact under a clearly given and transparent set of institutions about 
how to move the pieces. These are the rules of the game. The behavior of each actor is 
orientated in terms of these rules, acknowledging him or her in every move. Yet, the 
actual moves are determined by the strategies of each player, which aim at maximizing 
their advantages ” (2000:27).  
In other words, the rules in chess restrain the choice of alternative strategies so that 
actors abide by the idea of chess, and the same can be said about institutions and political 
actors. Hence, chess as well as institutions are both institutionalized practice and rules (Lane 
and Ersson, 2000:27).  
Although, most scholars within the field of institutionalism disagree on how to 
conceptualize institutions, they do agree that institutions should be seen as rules that influence 
the behavior of political and social actors (Keman, 1997:2). However, this thesis will adopt 
Scott´s definition of an institution (1995:33): “Institutions consists of cognitive, normative, 
and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behavior”.  This definition is very broad, however, it does clearly specify what shapes, an 
institution. The term institution is used in many ways, both scientifically and in everyday 
language and a broad definition like this is preferable for this reason, as well as other reasons 
that will become apparent further on. Like most definitions on institutions it also has an 
underlying conception of what rules do or how they affect human behavior, thereby affecting 
social and political action.  
 
2.2.2. The Schools of New Institutionalism  
New institutionalism can be traced back to the traditional institutionalist approach, but 
these are however, very different from each other (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991:13). 
According to March and Olsen (1984:738), new institutionalism differs from traditional 
institutionalism in that it can be characterized as a combination of aspects from old 




The traditional and new institutional approaches both view institutionalizations as a state-
dependent process that constrains organizational rationality through the limitation of options 
that they can pursue. However, they differ from each other in that they identify different 
sources of constraint. The traditional institutionalist approach emphasizes the entrustment of 
interests within organizations as a result of political trade offs and alliances, whereas the new 
institutionalist approach underlines the relationship between stability and legitimacy (Powell 
and DiMaggio, 1991:12).   
New Institutionalism is thus a relatively new theoretical paradigm that has received 
growing interest and acceptance in the social sciences. This new revival of interest in 
institutions is a consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions as social, 
political and economic institutions have become bigger, more complex and resourceful, and 
hence more important to collective life. Almost all crucial actors in modern economic and 
political systems are formal organizations, where the institutions of law and bureaucracy 
occupy a central role today (March and Olsen, 1984: 734).  
New institutionalism is not composed of a unified body of thought, and consists of 
various analytical approaches within the field that has risen over the past fifteen years (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996:936). These analytical approaches to institutions originate from different 
fields namely, in economics, organization theory, political science and sociology to name a 
few. The only commonality between these analytical approaches is that they only are linked 
to each other through a common scepticism to atomistic accounts of social processes and a 
common belief that institutional arrangements and social processes matter (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991:3). However, each of these analytical approaches within new institutionalism 
paint very different pictures of the political world.  
Although there are different strands within new institutionalism, there are particularly 
two approaches, which are relevant to this study, which are sociological institutionalism and 
historical institutionalism. These two approaches can be distinguished from each other, in that 
sociological institutionalism places a great emphasis on the norms of institutions as a way of 
understanding how they operate and how they shape individual behavior (Peters, 1999: 19). 
Historical institutionalism on the other hand, can be characterized by its focus on “real-world 
empirical questions, its historical orientation and its attention to the ways in which institutions 
structure and shape behaviour” (Steinmo, 2012:118). Sociological institutionalism and 




research has shown that institutions do count in surviving political crises such as social 
revolutions because they are instrumental in deciding if a transition occurs and whether or not 
the transition will take a democratic direction. Hence, the institutional structure of 
authoritarian regimes ultimately makes a difference for outcomes following a transition 
(Battera, 2014:546; Hinnebusch, 2006:380).  
 
2.2.3. Sociological Institutionalism 
The sociological perspective within new institutionalism is part of an emerging 
paradigm in the social sciences, which emerged primarily within the subfield of organization 
theory as a way of bringing back a sociological perspective on institutions into political 
science (Nee, 1998:1; Hall and Taylor: 1996:946). Since its founding, the discipline of 
sociology has been firmly associated with the study of social institutions and the comparative 
analysis of institutional change. This new institutionalism in sociology attempts to explain 
institutions instead of just assuming their existence (Nee, 1998:1). Scholars within this field 
have developed a set of theories that are of increasing interest to political scientists (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996:946).  
Sociological institutionalism can be traced back to the 1970s when some sociologists 
started to dispute the traditional division drawn between the parts of the social world that 
followed formal means of rationality, which are associated with modern forms of 
organizations and bureaucracies, and the parts of the social world that exhibited a varied set of 
practices associated with culture (Hall and Taylor, 1996:946). This traditional distinction may 
be traced back to one of the leading theorists within the discipline of sociology, namely Max 
Weber. His theoretical work from 1976 is clearly concerned with institutions and the 
development of rational institutions to meet the demands of modern society (Peters, 1999:98).  
According to Hall and Taylor:  
“Since Weber, many sociologists had seen the bureaucratic structures that dominate 
the modern landscape, in government departments, firms, schools, interest 
organizations and the like, as the product of an intensive effort to devise ever-more 
efficient structures for performing the tasks associated with modern society. The 
striking similarities in form taken by these otherwise rather-diverse organizations were 




performing these tasks. Culture was seen as something altogether different” 
(1996:946). 
 As a reaction to this, the new institutionalists in sociology argued that many of the 
institutional forms and procedures adopted by modern organizations were not just 
implemented on the account of them being most effective for the job. Instead they argued that 
that these institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizations, should be viewed 
as a consequence of the processes identified with the transmission of cultural practices (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996:946-7). Hence, the sociological institutionalists argued that bureaucratic 
practices have to be explained in cultural terms.  
Sociological institutionalists typically focus on why organizations take on specific 
institutional forms, procedures or symbols, and try to explain how such practices vary 
throughout organizations or across nations (Hall and Taylor, 1996:947). As mentioned earlier, 
culture is an integral part of this, as well as the sociological institutionalist paradigm in 
general. However, the notion of actors and interests is also an essential part of this paradigm. 
In the sociological institutionalist perspective, institutions are viewed as something more than 
constraints on choices. The identities and conceptions of actors are shaped by institutional 
structures. For this reason, interests and institutions become obscured, and accordingly 
institutions assume the role of actors. This is because individuals or actors are formed in the 
institutional context in which they live. Parliaments, governments and courts for example, 
promote interest that reflects their images of themselves and what they can contribute to 
society. Hence, in sociological institutionalism, the interests of institutions as organizations 
mirror historical legacies, national interests, and community needs (Lane and Ersson, 2000: 7-
8, 31). 
According to Hall and Taylor there are three aspects to sociological institutionalism 
that distinguishes it from other new institutional approaches. First, it tends to define 
institutions much more broadly, meaning that they do not just include formal rules, 
procedures, or norms, but also symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996:947). A definition of institutions from a sociological institutionalist 
perspective clears up the conceptual divide between institutions and culture. This has two 
important consequences. Firstly, it disputes the division that political scientists like to draw 
between institutional explanations built on organizational structures and cultural explanations 




redefine culture itself as an institution, thus, associating culture with a network of routines, 
symbols or scripts that provides patterns of behavior (Hall and Taylor, 1996:947-8). 
The second aspect to sociological institutionalism is the unique understanding of the 
relationship between institutions and individual action. Hence, sociological institutionalism 
follows a cultural approach (Hall and Taylor, 1996:948). The cultural approach emphasizes 
the extent to which an individual’s behavior is not fully strategic but is instead bounded by an 
individual´s worldview. It thus stresses the degree to which individuals turns to established 
routines or family patterns of behavior to achieve their purposes (Hall and Taylor, 
1996:939).  Many institutionalists focus on the cognitive dimension of institutional impact, 
thereby emphasising the way in which institutions influence behavior by providing the 
cognitive scripts, categories and models that are crucial for action, because without them the 
behavior of others cannot be interpreted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991:9-10; Hall and Taylor, 
1996:948). As DiMaggio and Powell puts it: “one cannot decide to get a divorce in a new 
manner, or play chess by different rules or opt out of paying tax” (1991:10). Hence, in the 
sociological institutionalist view, institutions influence individual´s behavior not just through 
specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a 
given context.  
The third and last aspect that distinguishes sociological institutionalism is its unique 
approach to explaining where institutional practices come from and change. Sociological 
institutionalists assert that organizations often adopt a new institutional practice because it 
improves the social legitimacy of its organization or its participants. Hence, organizations 
take on specific institutional forms or practices because they are widely valued within a 
broader cultural environment (Hall and Taylor, 1996:949). Soysal exemplifies this by arguing 
that the policies implemented by many states on immigrants, were adopted because of the 
evolving interpretation of human rights, which made some policies seem appropriate, while 
others were deemed illegitimate by the national authorities (Soysal, 1994:35). 
In light of the research question that this thesis is based upon, the sociological inspired 
view of new institutionalism in political science is both important and useful. First, it focuses 
on institutions and the way they interact and affect society. Second, this approach explains 
why and how institutions emerge in a given context and why they persist (Peters, 
1999:110).  In other words, this body of theory provides us with ways of understanding and 




new institutionalism can specify ways in which institutions can affect the underlying 
preferences or identities in actors, and takes the institutional environment into consideration 
as this can affect strategies that actors choose to pursue (Hall and Taylor, 1996:951).  
 
2.2.4. Historical Institutionalism  
Historical institutionalism is another approach within new institutionalism, which as 
stated by Steinmo  (2012:126) view “human beings are both norm-abiding rule followers and 
self-interested rational actors.” Subsequently, how actors behave is dependent upon 
individuals, on the context, and on the rulers. Historical institutionalists are therefore 
primarily concerned with understanding why a particular decision was made or why a 
particular outcome happened, which is exactly what this thesis is investigating. For the 
scholars from this particular strand of new institutionalism, political outcomes are a product 
of both rules and interest maximising (Steinmo, 2012:126). Historical Institutionalists places a 
great emphasis on history, and Steinmo (2012,127-128) argues that there are three important 
reasons for this. Firstly, political events occur within a historical context, which in return, has 
direct repercussions for the decisions or events that take place. Second, actors can learn from 
experience. Behaviour, attitudes, and strategic decisions emerge as a result of particular 
social, political, economic and cultural context. Third, actors’ beliefs are shaped by the past, 
and this in return will affect the actors´ decisions in the future.  
 A fundamental aspect of historical institutionalism is that policy choices made when 
an institution is established, will have lasting effects and clear influence over policies far into 
the future (Peters, 1999:63).  For this reason, historical institutionalists focus on the effects of 
institutions over time (Peters, 1999:63). As stated by Pollack (2005:139): “historical 
institutionalists argue that institutional choices taken in the past can persist, or become 
“locked in,” thereby shaping and constraining actors later in time.” Therefore, from a 
historical institutionalist perspective, institutions can be viewed as sticky and resistant to 
change due to the uncertainty related to institutional design (Pollack, 2005:127).  
One way of describing this argument is path dependency, which is mostly affiliated 
with historical institutionalism. Path dependence is an important aspect to consider here when 
studying regime transitions and democratization, as it may be a factor that influences the 
decisions of the ruling bloc within the authoritarian regime during political crises. Margaret 




“Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region 
has started down a path, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice 
points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct easy 
reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. 
From the same trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. 
Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber from one to the other—and 
essential if the chosen branch dies—the branch on which a climber begins is the one 
she tends to follow” (Levi, 1997: 28).  
Levi´s definition of path dependence, which is adopted here, refers to the concept as 
dynamic processes that involve positive feedback, which creates numerous possible outcomes 
depending on the particular sequence that events unfold (Pierson, 2004:20). Hence, an 
important aspect to historical processes that creates path dependence is positive feedback or 
self-reinforcement (Pierson, 2004:21). Therefore, positive feedback refers a process from 
which each step reinforces the probability of future change towards the same direction, 
because the cost of switching rises, which makes it more difficult to reverse the course 
(Pierson, 2004:21). Hence, when a government program or an organization starts on a path 
there is a tendency for those initial policy decisions to persist (Peters, 1999:63).   
According to Hall and Taylor, there are four aspects to historical institutionalism that 
renders it distinctive from other forms of new institutionalism. Firstly, the relationship 
between institutions and individual behaviour is often conceptualized in broad terms. 
Secondly, historical institutionalists emphasise asymmetries of power associated with the 
procedure and development of institutions. Historical institutionalists have especially been 
interested in the ways in which institutions distribute power unevenly across social groups 
and tend to stress how some groups loose while others win. Thirdly, their view on 
institutional change or development stresses path dependence and unintended consequences. 
Finally, historical institutionalist are interested in integrating institutional analysis with other 
various factors can explain political outcomes. Hence, historical institutionalists seldom assert 
that institutions are the only causal force in politics (Hall and Taylor, 1996:938; 941-942).  
As I am concerned with exploring a specific historical event, namely the Arab 
uprisings, and attempt to understand the different transitional outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia, 
the historical institutionalist approach is a very useful approach to adopt. Historical 




institutional change, makes it an important and fruitful approach for the research at hand. 
Historical institutionalism also makes it possible to look at institutions across time, which is 
very useful aspect for what this thesis is investigating as it can highlight which particular 
institutional choices caused Tunisia to democratize, and which ones caused Egypt to revert 
back to an authoritarian regime.  
	  
2.2.5. How does New Institutionalism Relate to the Middle East? 
How does new institutionalism fit with studies on the durability of authoritarian 
regimes and democratization? The new institutionalist approach essentially argues that the 
institutional structure of political regimes makes an important difference in their outcomes 
and durability (Hinnebusch, 2006:380). This institutionalist paradigm also demonstrates that 
institutions do count, especially with regards to the outcome once an authoritarian regime  has 
been toppled (Battera, 2014:547). As mentioned, Geddes claims that authoritarian regimes 
vary from each other as much as they do from democracies (1999:121). Similarly, 
institutionalism argues that authoritarian regimes are not identical, and vary in their level of 
institutionalization, which in return is formed by and forms the social forces that are included 
and excluded in society (Hinnebusch, 2006:380). 
According to Hinnebusch (2006:380), it is both necessary and important to distinguish 
between primitive forms of authoritarian regimes and more institutionalized authoritarian 
regimes, as this says a lot about authoritarian regime´s durability. Primitive forms of 
authoritarian regimes mainly consist of personalist dictatorships and military juntas, which 
lack institutions that are able to support social forces and implement policy. Thus, they are 
only likely to be viable at lower levels of development. Institutionalized authoritarian regimes 
on the other hand, are in a sense more modern than the former, which makes them more likely 
to be inclusive and developmentally capable, and thus more durable at higher levels of 
development. Institutionalized authoritarian regimes usually consist of authoritarian regimes 
with single party or corporatist systems with bureaucratic or technocratic institutions. 
Furthermore, most of the institutions in the Middle East can be characterized by intra-
elite coercion or in other words a fusion between the ruling coalition, which consists of the 
state, the hegemonic party and the security apparatus. This fusion between the ruling 
coalitions highlights a lack of autonomy between the institutions in the region (Battera, 




important, as weak institutions are ineffective (Hinnebusch, 2006:380). This fits well with the 
new institutionalist approach, which firmly believes that structures and organizations do count 
in surviving a crisis because they manage to maintain their own position and are influential in 
deciding if a transition occurs as well as which direction the transition will take (Battera, 
2014:546).  
 
2.3 The Rational Choice Theory 
This section focuses on rational choice theory (RCT), which is essentially a 
framework for understanding behaviour and interaction between actors. The interactions 
between key actors involved in a transition process are important to political outcomes. This 
section is divided into three sub-sections. The first subsection discusses the concept of 
rationality, which is the basic assumption within RCT. The second subsection presents the 
origin of RCT and its core assumptions. The third subsection presents and discusses two main 
actors within the authoritarian ruling bloc that are involved in the transition process.  
 
2.3.1 The Concept of Rationality 
The fundamental premise within the RCT is the rationality assumption, namely, that 
actors are deemed rational (Dowding and King, 1995:1). In other words, this theoretical 
approach assumes that all actors act in a rational manner, meaning that they would not 
intentionally make choices that would ultimately leave them worse off. In relation to the 
concept of rationality, Jon Elster has developed two forms of rationality. The first one is the 
thin theory of rationality, where actions are deemed rational if they emerge from consistent 
beliefs and desires on behalf of the actor. Subsequently, a rational action in any given 
circumstance is one that the actor believes will ultimately end in the desired result. Elster´s 
thin theory of rationality only requires consistency, namely consistency within the belief 
system; consistency within the system of desires; and consistency between beliefs and desires 
on the one hand and the reason for the action on the other hand (1983:1).  
Elster´s second form of rationality is his broad theory of rationality, which goes 
beyond the requirements of the thin theory of rationality in that it that the requirements are 




beliefs and desires. It requires that beliefs and desires should be rational in a more substantive 
sense. This entails that beliefs are based on available evidence, which is closely related to 
judgment. Desires, on the other hand, are based on autonomous preferences (Elster, 1983:1-
2). Whereas Elster´s thin theory of rationality only requires consistency, the broad theory of 
rationality requires consistency, judgment and autonomy. I believe that Elster´s thin theory of 
rationality is sufficient for this thesis, as such, an action is deemed rational when an actor 
believes it will lead to the desired result. 
Furthermore, the idea of a rational action within RCT is generally understood as a 
conscious social actor who engages in intentional calculative strategies (Scott, 2000:128). 
Homans (1961:21-3) holds that human behaviour is similar to animal behaviour in that it is 
determined. This essentially means that humans behave in a specific manner that would 
reward them, and stay away from what might punish them. Subsequently, reinforcement 
through rewards and punishments is the determining factor in human behaviour. Therefore, 
according to Homans´ argument, human behaviour can be studied in external and objective 
forms.  
Not all RCT theorists have relied upon behavioural psychology as Homans. In fact, 
many scholars affiliated with the filed of RCT are sceptical about the determinants of human 
action. Instead, they argue that individuals act as if they were rational and, therefore, 
rationality can be taken as an unproblematic starting point. As a result, many rational choice 
theorists simply construct understandable and predictive theories of human action. In their 
view, then, there is no need to deeply understand individual psychology (Scott, 2000:129). 
The rationality assumption is important to consider here, as it is the cornerstone of the 
RCT. This is an excellent basis for what this study seeks investigate, as I am interested in 
actors behaviour during a political crisis. Previous research has shown that what the elites 
within the ruling coalition do, during a political crisis is critical for the outcomes of a 
transition (Hinnebusch, 2006:387). Accordingly, this study wants to explore whether or not 
the actors within institutions acted in a rational manner by making decisions that would be to 
their advantage during the Arab uprisings.   
	  
2.3.2 Rational Choice Theory: Origins and Central Assumptions 
           RCT was originally developed in the field of economics to construct formal and often 




“In its purest form, it (rational choice, rem.) refers to behaviour by an individual actor – a 
person, a form, or a political entity – designed to further the actor´s perceived self-interest, 
subject to information and opportunity costs.” In economic theories the interest lies primarily 
in the ways in which production, distribution and consumption of goods and services are 
arranged through money and market mechanisms. However, scholars have argued that the 
same general principles of RCT can be used to understand interactions between political 
actors (Scott, 2000:127). Subsequently, the concept of rational and social behaviour has 
increasingly become more popular within the social sciences, and political scientists have 
attempted to form theories on the premise that all actions are rational, and that actors consider 
the probable costs and benefits of any action before determining what to do (Scott, 2000:126).   
           RCT has three main branches, which is a classification first developed by Harsanyi. 
These three branches consist of: the unity theory, game theory and ethics. Unity theory deals 
with individual rational behaviour under certainty, under risk, and under uncertainty. The 
basic idea is that in all these three instances of certainty, risk and uncertainty, rational 
behaviour exists in utility maximization or expected-utility maximization of an actor´s utility 
(Harsanyi, 1986:89). Game theory describes rational behaviour in game situations through 
determining solutions for different classes of games (Harsanyi, 1986:89). Ethics is the theory 
of rational moral value judgement, in other words it is a theory based on the rational actors 
preferences, which are based on their moral value judgements that can be based on impartial 
and impersonal criteria (Harsanyi, 1986:89).  
Although RCT consists of various strands, this thesis will focus on the general aspects 
of the rational choice approach. This is because I am interested in the theory as a whole, and 
its explanations concerning how actors make rational decisions during the events of the Arab 
uprisings. As Boudon (2009:180) argues, “As RCT is a family of theories with many 
versions, it is advisable to present the postulates in a general way in order to transcend the 
variants of the theory.” Therefore, as RCT emphasises the rationality of actors, in which 
actors behave in a manner that will lead to their own advantage, this theoretical approach is 
useful when investigating the transitional outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia.   
           A fundamental premise within all forms of RCT is the belief that complex social 
phenomena can be explained in terms of the elementary individual actions of which they are 
composed (Scott, 2000:127). For this reason, RCT maintain a methodological individualist 




action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result 
of the action and interaction of individuals” (Elster, 1989:13). In other words, the actor is at 
the centre of this theory and it is individuals who ultimately take actions. In order to explain a 
social phenomenon one must therefore look at the interaction between actors.    
           RCT assumes that individuals are driven by desires and goals, which in return, mirror 
their preferences. As Scott (2000:127-8) explains, individuals: “[…] act within specific, given 
constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about the conditions under 
which they are acting”. Hence, Individuals must make choices in relation to both their goals 
as well as the ways to achieve these goals because it is not possible for them to achieve all 
that they desire (Scott, 2000:128). RCT maintain that individuals predict the outcome of 
alternative courses of action and determine the alternative that is most favourable to them 
(Heath: 1976:3).   
            Monroe (2001:153) identifies seven core assumptions that characterize RCT. First, 
actors pursue goals. Second, their goals mirror the actors perceived self-interests. Third, 
individuals’ behaviour is a result of a process that involves a conscious choice. Fourth, the 
individual is the main actor in society. Fifth, the preferences of actors are ordered in a 
consistent and stable manner. Sixth, If possible, actors will choose the alternative with the 
highest expected advantage. Seventh, actors retain considerable information on the available 
alternatives as well as the probable consequences of their choices. Thus, according to RCT, a 
rational actor is an individual who behaves according to his or hers own individual self-
interests and conscious choice. The individual possesses extensive information, and 
knowledge of the environment. He or she has an organized and stable system of preferences, 
and has the ability to carefully consider the best available alternative in relation to his or her 
preference. Hinnebusch illustrates how RCT relates to transition and democratization, and 
maintains that: 
“Many democratic transitions have been elite-initiated but it seems reasonable to 
expect that political elites, as rational actors, will only democratize if they think their 
vital interests will survive or even be enhanced by the transition from authoritarianism 
or that the costs and risks of democratization would be lower than those of continued 
repression” (2006:387).  
           Although RCT has a tendency to assume that individuals have selfish goals, there is 




selflessness or self-destruction.  If a man, for example, decides to hang himself, then 
rationality simply asserts that the man does what he believes is rational (Green and Fox, 
2007:270). As Green and Fox (2007:270) argues: “The defining characteristic of rational 
choice theory is not what it assumes about human objectives but rather the notion that 
individuals pursue their aims efficiently”. Subsequently, RCT does not have to assume that all 
individuals have selfish motives, however, many such theories believe that individuals seek 
money, power and prestige (Green and Fox, 2007:270). 
           Overall, the RCT has produced successful and convincing explanations of many 
complex social phenomena (Boudon, 2009:181). Boudon illustrates this through the work of 
Alexis de Tocqueville, who used what would later be considered RCT in his explanation of 
the stagnation of French agriculture at the end of the eighteenth century while comparing it to 
the British agriculture. Tocqueville was successful in explaining the different path of 
agricultural modernization between France and England, which was effectively due to the 
rational actions of individuals (2009:181). Moreover, Chai (2001:9) argues that RCT´s 
generality is one of its main advantages. More specifically, a single set of assumptions 
relating to each type of actor in any given circumstance, is compatible with any set of 
structural assumptions about the environmental setting where the actor is present. The RCT is 
therefore a fruitful theory to base this study on, as I am primarily concerned with explaining a 
the Arab uprisings, and understand if the ruling elite in Egypt and Tunisia made rational 
decisions during the revolution.   
           In summary, RCT adopts a methodological individualist position, and attempts to 
explain social phenomena by assuming that actors make rational choices based on their 
preferences that will ultimately bring them benefits. Hence, RCT assumes that an actor 
chooses an alternative that he or she believes will lead to an outcome that will expand the 
actor´s payoff. The theory places the individual at the centre, and assumes that social 
phenomena can be explained in terms of rational decisions made by individuals. RCT focuses 
on the actions of individuals and to see all other social phenomena as reducible to these 
individual actions. Hence, RCT is a useful theory when analysing democratic transitions, 





2.3.3 Political actors in a Transition Process 
           The interaction between central political actors in authoritarian regimes is central for a 
democratic transition to take place, and for this reason RCT is an attractive approach to 
employ for investigating the different transitions that occurred in Egypt and Tunisia. RCT 
basically assumes that individuals pursue their goals effectively. The actors at hand can either 
possess a great deal of information or none at all, however, based on their understanding of 
the available alternatives in front of them, they select the course of action that has the 
potential to give them the best advantage (Greene and Fox, 2007:269). This is particularly 
relevant with regards to how the authoritarian ruling bloc manage a political crisis such as the 
Arab uprisings.  
           One of the most influential contributors to the literature of democratic transitions is 
Adam Przeworski, who through his work seeks to explain the strategies of actors involved in 
the process of regime change. According to Przeworski (1992:117), the authoritarian ruling 
bloc can be separated into two main groups, namely hard-liners and soft-liners. The hard-
liner/ soft-liner typology was first developed by O´Donnell and is important to examine as it 
conceptualizes variations within a regime. 
Hard-liners can be found among the repressive cores of the authoritarian ruling bloc, 
and consists of various factions within regimes that comply uncompromisingly with the 
regimes ideology or policies. Hard-liners can be found in the police, the legal bureaucracy, 
censors, and journalists, etc. Hard-liners believe that the authoritarian regimes continuance 
and survival is both possible and desirable either through rejecting any democratic forms or 
by building a façade from which they can maintain their power (Przeworski, 1992:117; 
O´Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:16). Consequently, hard-liners are likely to remain stubborn 
in the wake of a political crisis and if a transition has started, or a democracy has been 
established, they are likely to be responsible for attempted coups and conspiracies.  
Soft-liners can be difficult to distinguish from hard-liners in that they are just as likely 
as hard-liners to use repression and to tolerate arbitrary acts from the security apparatus. 
O´Donnell and Schmitter (1986:16) distinguish soft-liners by their: “increasing awareness that 
the regime they helped to implant, and in which they usually occupy important positions, will 
have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degree or some form of electoral 




maintain their power in the future they will have to liberalize. Soft-liners consist of politicians 
from the regime and some groups outside the state apparatus (Przeworski, 1992:117).  
According to O´Donnell and Schmitter (1986:19): “There is no transition whose 
beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the 
authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavages between hardliners and 
softliners”. Furthermore, transitions usually begin when there is a disagreement between hard-
liners and soft-liners over the management of a political crisis as for example big popular 
protests against the authoritarian rule (Lee, 2009:641-642). This is where the division between 
the authoritarian blocs occurs, because for hard-liners, the crisis will not be seen as severe 
enough to take the political risk that comes with liberalization. In fact, hard-liners believe that 
the existing political structure will be enough for the regime to survive the crisis (Lee: 2009: 
642). However, soft-liners, believe that in order for the regime to remain legitimate, the 
authoritarian regime cannot wait to long before reintroducing various freedoms that are 
somewhat acceptable to moderate segments of the opposition and to the internal public 
opinion (O´Donnell and Schmitter: 1986:16).  
           Transitions are uncertain in the sense that their outcome is a function of actors’ own 
beliefs, preferences and decisions. Transitions are also uncertain in that the available 
information about opponents’ strength is often obscure, and as a result, mistakes or 
miscalculations can occur, which can lead to unintended consequences that will either 
advance or slow a transition (Brumberg, 2014:35). Transitions from authoritarian regimes are 
ultimately based upon an agreement between different political actors, which fits in nicely 
with RCT. As this thesis focuses on the transition from authoritarian rule in both Egypt and 
Tunisia following the Arab uprisings, it is essential to investigate the interaction between key 
actors involved in the transition process.   
 
2.4 What can explain Egypt and Tunisia´s different trajectory?  
The new institutional approach and rational choice theory are two theoretical 
approaches that I have presented and reviewed above, and are considered the theoretical 
framework from which this thesis is based upon. Subsequently, in this section I present three 
hypotheses that I am going to test and explore based on the two theories presented above. 
These three hypotheses may give some insight into why Tunisia experienced a democratic 




within the new institutional approach. The second hypothesis follows historical 
institutionalism within the new institutional approach. Finally, the last hypothesis follows 
rational choice theory.  
 
Hypothesis1: The more autonomous the state apparatus and the military are from each other, 
in an authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization.  
 
Hypothesis2: The more the state apparatus and the military are willing to compromise after a 
revolution, the higher the probability of democratization.   
 
Hypothesis3: The more divided the state apparatus, and the military are during a revolution, 

















Chapter 3: Method  
There are two main approaches when designing a study, namely, qualitative and 
quantitative research designs. Qualitative researches focuses on in depth small samples, and 
are concerned with issues of the richness, texture and feeling of fresh data. Quantitative 
research on the other hand, focuses on large samples selected at random, and are concerned 
with issues of design, and measurement (Neuman, 2006:149). The qualitative and quantitative 
approaches are thus two different research approaches in political science, which uses 
different research techniques to investigate the world we live in. However, these two 
approaches are on two opposing sides where scholars from each side believe that their 
approach is the advantageous one (Neuman, 2006:151-2). This makes it difficult to assess 
which approach is the most suitable. 
This thesis will be based on the qualitative approach, because a small- N study is more 
suitable and appropriate for my research question as I am investigating two cases in depth, 
namely, Tunisia and Egypt. The reason why these two particular cases were chosen is 
elaborated upon in section 3.3.3. Qualitative researches are likely to look at whole cases, and 
compare these whole cases with one another (Ragin, 1987:3). This is exactly what I wish to 
do when investigating my research question and two cases. A qualitative research strategy has 
several advantages and the reason why this thesis has been based on this approach will 
become more apparent later on.  
This chapter presents and justifies methodological approaches applied throughout the 
thesis, and is structured in the following way. First, the research question and the research 
design, from which this thesis is based upon, will be presented. Second, I briefly present and 
discuss the comparative method, which defines the logic of case-oriented comparative 
research. Third, I present comparative historical analysis, which is one of two research 
strategies applied to this study. I also justify and present the cases applied to this study. 
Fourth, I present process tracing, which is the second research strategy applied to this study. 
In this section I additionally discuss the procedure form which I have collected my data.  
 
3.1 Research Question and Research Design  
As a reminder, the research question that I am attempting to answer is: “Why did 




both appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?” Accordingly, in order to understand 
Egypt and Tunisia´s different paths following the Arab uprisings I have proposed three 
distinct hypotheses to answer the research question.  
 Therefore, the research centres around two specific cases, namely, Egypt and Tunisia. 
The main objective of this thesis is to find out why these two countries, which appear to have 
relatively similar authoritarian regimes, experienced different outcomes following the Arab 
uprisings. The research question centre around a why question, which according to Yin 
(2014:10): “are more explanatory and more likely to lead to the use of a case study, history or 
experiment as the preferred research method”. Subsequently, the research design for this 
thesis consists of comparative historical analysis and process tracing.    
Case studies generally consist of in-depth research on phenomenons of scientific 
interest of an “instance of a class of events” (George and Bennett, 2005:17). George and 
Bennett holds that “class of events” can refer to revolutions, types of governmental regimes, 
economic systems. As this thesis focuses on the Arab uprisings, a revolution that occurred in 
the Arab world in 2011, a case study approach is appropriate. Yin (2014:16) defines case 
studies as: “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and 
within its real-world context”.  
The aim of this study is to investigate factors that may have contributed to Egypt and 
Tunisia´s different paths after the Arab uprisings, and therefore a case study approach is a 
suitable one. Moreover, the research at hand focuses on two cases and according to Tarrow 
(2010:246) two cases: “[…] offers a balanced combination of descriptive depth and analytical 
challenge that progressively declines as more cases are added.” Two cases permit the 
researcher to examine how common mechanisms are affected by the particular characteristics 
of each case. However, when the number of cases increases this advantage weakens as the 
number of unmeasured variables increases (Tarrow, 2010:246). Subsequently, I believe that 
comparing two cases will provide a stronger basis for the research, as it will allow me to get a 







3.2 The Comparative Method 
The comparative method in social science is concerned with identifying the 
similarities and differences among social units (Ragin, 1987:1), which in return provides a 
blueprint to understand, explain and interpret various historical outcomes and processes 
(Ragin, 1987:6). Furthermore, Ragin (1987:17) claims that: “The comparative method is 
superior to the statistical method in several important respects”. First, he argues that the 
statistical method is not combinable because according to him, it is difficult to use this 
method to investigate situations as wholes. Second, the utilization of the comparative method 
provides explanations that account for every instance of a phenomenon. Third, the researcher 
sets the boundaries of a comparative examination and as such this method does not require 
researchers to pretend that they have samples of societies from a particular population. 
Ragin´s last argument for the superiority of the comparative method is that it forces the 
researcher to be closely acquainted with the cases relevant to the analysis (Ragin, 1987:16).  
The comparative method is thus a case-oriented strategy of comparative research. It 
focuses on comparing cases and examining them as wholes, which is also what distinguishes 
it from statistical methods (Ragin, 1987:16). The comparative method is also the favoured 
research strategy for political and social scientists when studying a small number of cases, 
and investigating institutions or other macropolitical phenomena (della Porta, 2008:202). I 
believe that the comparative method is a useful approach for the purposes of my thesis as I am 
studying two cases in-depth and investigating a macro-structural phenomenon. According to 
della Porta (2008:202), the comparative method has the capacity to go beyond descriptive 
statistical measures towards an in-depth understanding of historical processes and individual 
motivations. This is exactly what this thesis is investigating, making the comparative method 
a useful approach for this thesis.   
 
3.2.1 Comparative Historical Analysis as a Research Strategy  
Historical comparative research is both a useful and effective method when the 
research addresses big societal processes. This research method is appropriate when 
researchers are examining combinations of social factors that generates a specific outcome 
and for comparing social systems to find out what societies have in common and what 





Comparisons are an integral part of contemporary social sciences, without them social 
inquiry is not possible. Today, there is a strong tradition of social scientific research where 
comparative research is the dominant method of investigation. This is comparative historical 
analysis. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2009:6) describe comparative historical analysis as: “a 
long standing intellectual project oriented towards the explanation of substantively important 
outcomes”.  According to them, comparative historical analysis is not unified by one theory or 
one method.  
However, work within the field of comparative historical analysis all share three 
common characteristics, namely, causal analysis, an emphasis of processes over time, and the 
use of systematic and contextualized comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:10). 
Furthermore, the combination of these three dimensions is what makes the comparative 
historical approach distinct from other methodological approaches. In addition, these three 
dimensions combined, provide a definition of comparative historical analysis. I will now look 
further into them.  
The first aspect is the concern for causal analysis. This entails an interest in explaining 
and identifying causal arrangements that generates extensive outcomes of interest. In other 
words, the first aspect focuses on causal inference through the investigation of explanations of 
a specific political or social outcome. The causal argument is essential to comparative 
historical analysis and thus, causal propositions are cautiously selected and tested (Mahoney 
and Rueschemeyer, 2009:10). Hence, comparative historical analysis is concerned with works 
that try to find causes of important outcomes.  
The second aspect that comparative historical researchers are concerned with is 
analysing historical sequences and focusing on the unfolding of processes over time 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:12). Therefore, the events that are of interests to 
comparative historical researchers, are not statistic instances that occur at a single fixed point 
in time, but are instead, processes that unfold over time and in time. Hence, comparative 
historical researchers include attention to the temporal structure of events in their explanations 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:12).  
Finally, the last aspect is its use of systematic and contextualized comparisons of 
similar and contrasting cases, which is what, also renders comparative historical analysis 
distinctive from other methods (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:13). This distinction 




exchange between theory and evidence in a manner that is unlikely in quantitative methods 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2009:13).  This is the strength of comparative historical 
analysis, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2009:13) argue: “By employing a small number of 
cases, comparative historical researchers can comfortably move back and forth between 
theory and history in many iterations of analysis as they formulate new concepts, discover 
novel explanations, and refine preexisting theoretical explanations in light of detailed case 
evidence”.  
However, the most common criticism of this method is what Rueschemeyer refers to 
as the “small-N problem” which is a combination of many explanatory variables that are 
expected to be causally relevant with evidence from only a small number of cases 
(Rueschemeyer, 2009:305). The issue for critics is that the study of a single case or a few 
cases creates only one reasonable theoretical outcome, specifically, to produce hypotheses 
that can be tested in other various cases. Hence, according to critics of comparative historical 
analysis, the aim of this method is producing theoretical ideas. Yet, Rueschemeyer argues that 
case studies accord more than just theory that produces theoretical ideas. He argues that they 
can test theoretical proposition as well as offer compelling causal explanations 
(Rueschemeyer, 2009:318). Similarly, Ragin (1978) argues that a small-N case research is 
more valuable than cross case studies to explain particular outcomes.   
In sum, comparative historical analysis is an effective analytic tool when investigating 
complex societal phenomenons. Through comparative historical analysis we can generate 
theories, test theoretical propositions and present causal explanations. I mentioned that I am 
going to test the hypotheses that I have developed to answer the research question and as such 
I believe that comparative historical analysis is the best-suited approach for this thesis.  
 
3.2.2 Why does Comparative Historical Analysis Apply?  
As mentioned, comparative historical analysis is an appropriate research strategy when 
researchers are investigating social factors that creates specific outcomes and for comparing 
similarities and differences between various social systems. I argue that comparative 
historical analysis is an excellent research strategy for my thesis as my research question is 
interested in causal factors that may explain why Egypt and Tunisia experienced different 
outcomes following the Arab uprisings. The aim of this thesis is thus, to find and explain what 




characterize comparative historical analysis as mentioned by Mahoney and Rueschemeyer. 
My research question requires causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time as well as 
the use of systematic and contextual comparison.  
First, I am interested in finding that casual arrangements that can explain why Tunisia 
resulted in democratization while Egypt returned to an authoritarian regime. Second, in order 
to find these causal arrangements I am going to analyse Tunisia and Egypt in historical 
sequences by focusing on the processes that unfolded over time and in time. Third, I am going 
to use systematic and contextualized comparisons of similar cases, in order to answer the 
research question. Accordingly, I argue that my research is best suited within the framework 
of comparative historical analysis.  
 
3.2.3 Case-selection: Why Tunisia and Egypt?  
Case selection is an important element for any research design. For that reason, it is 
important that suitable cases for comparison are carefully considered before being selected. 
Tunisia and Egypt are selected for this thesis mainly because of the similarities between the 
two countries. This includes, the geographical area, the homogeneity of the population, their 
shared state-building history, the fact that both countries are republics and were not rentier 
states, and finally that both countries presented a strong fusion between the pillars of coalision 
in power, namely, the state, the party in power and the military. However, Tunisia and Egypt 
were not only chosen because of the authoritarian regimes similarities, but also for the fact 
that their paths diverged following the Arab uprsings. This is also what makes this research so 
interesting. Why was Egypt able to withstand democratization? What factors lead Tunisia 
towards democracy?  
As the research question states, the cases selected for the research have been selected 
in advance. Hence, I began this research knowing the two cases that I would apply before I 
found the theories that I wanted to test. George and Bennett argue that researchers can either 
begin their investigation with a theory, before looking for a test case or by starting with a case 
or cases before looking for theories that one can test. According to them, either case selection 
approach is applicable as long as one takes care of selection bias (George and Bennett: 
2005:83).  Selection bias is one of the most common critiques of case study methods and 
occurs according to Collier and Mahoney (1996:59) when “[...]	   Some form of selection 




results in interferences that suffers from systematic error”. In other words, this can happen 
when cases or subjects are self-selected (George and Bennett, 2005:23).  
As I am interested in a particular phenomenon it requires that I select the cases in 
advance. The nature of the research requires two similar countries that experience a different 
outcome and thus, they cannot be chosen through random sampling. Researchers of case 
study methods have argued that the selection on the dependent variable should not be rejected 
out of hand as selection of cases on the basis of the value of their dependent variables is 
fitting for some purposes (George and Bennett, 2005:23). Case selection on the dependent 
variable is an effective way of uncovering potential causal paths and variables that ultimately 
leads to the outcome of the dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005:23). 
 
3.3 Process Tracing and Data Collection  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, in addition to applying the research strategy 
of comparative historical analysis, I will also apply the strategy of process tracing, which is an 
analytic tool for causal inference. Process tracing consists of examining “diagnostic” pieces of 
evidence within a case, which in return can assist in either supporting or overturning 
alternative explanatory hypotheses (Bennett, 2010:208). Moreover, Collier, Brady and 
Seawright (2010:201) define process tracing as: “The examination of diagnostic pieces of 
evidence, commonly evaluated in specific temporal sequence, with the goal of supporting or 
overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses”. The main focus of a researcher that applies 
process tracing is then to learn if a specific factor can be traced and linked to another 
(Vennesson, 2008:233). The goal of this thesis is to establish if the events that took place in 
Egypt and Tunisia fit the hypotheses presented in chapter 2, making process tracing an 
attractive analytical tool.  
Moreover, the diagnostic pieces of evidence that are examined through process tracing 
are called causal process observations (CPOs). Collier, Brady and Seawright (2010:201-202) 
assert that: “Process tracing consists of procedures for singling out specific CPOs and 
evaluating their contribution to causal inference in a given analytic setting. Collier et al.  
further expand on this by emphasising that qualitative researchers that analyses processes rely 
upon CPOs. Furthermore, they define CPO as: “an insight or piece of data that provides 
information about context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage in causal 
inference” (2010:184). In other words, CPOs are proof regarding what happened during a 




transition processes in Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab uprisings. The strength of CPOs lies 
in its in-depth insight (Collier, et al., 2010:24). Researchers collect CPOs from an array of 
primary and secondary sources, which will be discussed shortly.   
Hence, causal inference in qualitative research consists of two joint tools: process 
tracing and CPOs. Although process tracing has many advantages it has also been criticized. 
The step-by-step approach to process tracing has mainly been criticized as a form of story 
telling. Tilly for instance argues that stories are an instinctive human way of ordering 
experience, but they do not necessarily help in generating causal analysis (Tilly, 2002:9-10). 
However, according to Vennesson process tracing differs from stories in three ways. First, 
process tracing is focused in that it selectively handles only certain aspect of the phenomenon 
under study. Second, process tracing is structured in the manner where the researcher is 
developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework. Third, the goal with 
process tracing is essentially to find a chronological explanation of a causal path that leads to 
a specific outcome (2008:235).  
The procedure for gathering data is an important part in any given scientific research. 
As Lange (2013:140) argues, “Science ultimately involves gathering and analyzing data in 
ways that offer insight into the phenomena under investigation. In this way, data are the most 
central component of the scientific enterprise.” Therefore, it is important that the researcher 
gathers information properly and carefully considers the data that is analysed.  
The data for this study will be gathered through CPOs, which will provide insight into 
the mechanisms that caused the different transitional outcomes between Egypt and Tunisia 
following the Arab uprisings. Accordingly, the CPOs will be based on material from 
newspaper articles, scientific articles, YouTube clips, speeches of key actors, as well as books 
on the particular events that took place in Egypt and Tunisia during the Arab uprisings. 
Combined, this material provides insight into the causal mechanisms that contributed to the 









Chapter 4: A Historical Overview of Egypt and Tunisia   
This chapter will present a brief historical overview of Egypt and Tunisia. 
Accordingly, it will serve as an introduction, and provide the reader with necessary context 
and background for the analysis of this thesis. The first section of this chapter consists of the 
authoritarian legacy that has characterized both Egypt and Tunisia for over half a century. 
Furthermore, the next two sections provide an overview of Egypt and then Tunisia’s political 
history. The fourth section examines, and compares the state apparatus in Egypt and Tunisia 
prior to the Arab uprisings in 2011. The final section explores, the military in each country 
before 2011. Together, these sections will give a more holistic understanding of the political 
climate before 2011.  
 
4.1 The Authoritarian Legacy in Egypt and Tunisia  
Both Egypt and Tunisia have for well over half a century been characterized by 
authoritarian rule (Gelvin, 2012:37). The dominant institutional form that created the current 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East was populist authoritarian regimes (PA). According 
to Hinnebusch (2006:380) Middle Eastern regimes took the form of PA, as a result of an 
alliance between the middle classes and peasants because of a revolt against old oligarchies. 
The rebellion against the old oligarchies were run by the military and/or a single party, which 
in return ended in the expansion of the military and the bureaucracy, which eventually became 
the largest organizations in society (Battera, 2014:548).  
The Middle Eastern PA regimes eventually experienced international pressure and 
economic decline, which they inescapably had to adapt to. As a result of this, by the 1980s, all 
the PA regimes in the Middle East were transformed into post-populist authoritarian regimes 
(PPA), which involved economic liberalization (Hinnebusch, 2006:383-84). Hinnebusch 
(2006:384) holds that “Economic liberalization was seem as the key to regime survival as it 
was expected that it would make the private sector a new engine of growth to supplement the 
stagnating public sector and generate a new bourgeoisie class with a stake in the regime ”.  
The transformation from PA regimes into PPA regimes in the Arab world is important 
to consider here as it has had profound effect on the current regimes in the region. This is 
especially the case for the triangular relationship that exists between the state, the hegemonic 




in the Middle East at an early stage, common patterns of interplay between a powerful elite 
developed simultaneously to ensure their continuity in power”. In other words, the elites 
within society such as military troops, bureaucrats, party leaders and businessmen all 
gathered, in order to find ways to preserve and maintain each other’s interests. This occurred 
to the point that the organizations or institutions they governed fused together. (Battera, 
2014:548). Consequently, the fusion of organizations/institutions in these regimes created a 
conflicting impact on organizational autonomy. 
What renders Tunisia and Egypt distinct from all other Arab states is their shared 
history of state building, which dates all the way back to the nineteen century. As Henry 
(2014:130) explains: “Egypt´s Muhammad Ali and Tunisia´s Ahmed Bey engaged in modern 
state building in the nineteenth century and, unlike the other Arab republics, enjoyed previous 
legacies as political entities living off their respective tax bases”. Tunisia and Egypt were a 
part of the Ottoman Empire, however, both countries retained considerable autonomy. In 
order to protect this autonomy, rulers adopted the same style of governance and governing 
institutions that was similar to European states. The rulers in Egypt and Tunisia believed that 
by implementing a similar design, they could achieve the same level of strength as the 
European states. Consequently, the modernized their militaries, built up infrastructure and 
implemented new legislation that was based on those of Europe (Gelvin, 2012:36).  
Moreover, in 1881 when France made Tunisia a protectorate, Tunisia did not attempt 
to change the processes of centralization or development. Similarly when Britain occupied 
Egypt in 1882, they established additional institutions and structures, which continued to 
develop in Egypt. The processes of centralization and development carried on in Tunisia after 
the country won its independence from France in 1956, and the same happened in Egypt after 
Gamal Abd al-Nasser seized control in 1952 (Gelvin, 2012:36).  
Egypt and Tunisia´s common history of state building left a legacy in both countries of 
strong national identities and administrative stability. Prior to the uprisings in 2011 then, 
Egypt and Tunisia had strong centralized bureaucracies in place, as well as advanced health, 
education, and social services (Lesch, 2014:64). As Gelvin (2012:37) asserts “strong 
institutions, such as the army, did not splinter, while others, such as those dealing with the 
economy and administration, remained in place to pick up the pieces even after the rulers left 





4.2 Egypt: The Context 
Egypt developed into a constitutional monarchy following British colonial rule. In 
addition to having a king, from 1922 up until 1952, Egypt also had a parliament where seats 
were competed for, political parties that competed against each other, and a press that was 
somewhat free (Gelvin, 2012:38). This was hardly a “golden age” as Gelvin (2012:38) states; 
however, it was less authoritarian than the regime that would succeed it. This all came to an 
end in 1952 when the Free Officers, led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser dethroned King Farouk in a 
military coup. Nasser and the Free Officers were nationalists that criticized the monarchy for 
corruption and inequalities in Egypt (Brynen et al., 2012:22). Regardless of this, when 
acquiring power, Nasser and the Free Officers banned all other political parties and repressed 
the political opposition thereby establishing  “a one-man, one party rule” (Gelvin, 2012:38).  
Accordingly, ever since 1952, and prior to the uprisings in 2011, Egypt had only 
known three presidents. The first one was naturally Nasser, who ruled from 1952 to 1970. The 
second president was Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat was Nasser´s vice president and fellow army 
officer. He took over the presidency following Nasser´s death in 1970, and ruled from 1970 to 
1981. Sadat had separate views to Nasser with regards to domestic and foreign policy, which 
made him establish a peace deal with Israel in 1979, reorganize Egypt´s foreign policy toward 
the US, and initiate economic liberalization to a certain extent (Brynen et al., 2012:22). In 
1976, Sadat established a restricted multi-party system, and created the National Democratic 
Party (NDP), which became the hegemonic party and served as a pro-regime political force 
(Blaydes, 2008: 5-6) The Muslim brotherhood (MB) that were repressed under Nasser were 
also eventually permitted to re-emerge as a social movement (Brynen et al., 2012:22).  
In 1981 Islamist radicals assassinated Sadat, and his vice-president Hosni Mubarak 
assumed the presidency. Mubarak thus became Egypt´s third president, and ruled from 1981 
up until 2011 when the Arab uprisings occurred (Gelvin, 2012:37). It is important to note that 
prior to the uprisings in 2011, which resulted in the election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012, all 
of Egypt´s presidents including Mubarak came up through the military (Norton, 2012:338). 
When Mubarak became president, he continued with most of Sadat´s policies, which included 
maintaining a close relationship with the US, as well as continued economic reform and 
privatization that mostly benefited business leaders close to the regime. He continued with 
multi-party elections, and like Sadat, Mubarak ensured that NDP always won elections with 




The general discontent among citizens grew over the years, as a result of the social and 
economic injustices in Egypt. The unemployment rate was high even among people with 
middle and higher education levels. There was also a significant rise in food prices between 
2010 and 2011, which added to people’s unhappiness. Additionally, years of crony capitalism 
had added to the widespread public perception that the benefits of economic development 
went directly in the pockets of the elite that were close to the regime (Brynen, et al., 2012:23). 
This was essentially the political context in Egypt when the uprisings flared up in Tunisia, and 
inspired the Egyptian opposition. On the 25th of January 2011, Egyptian activists started to 
protest police brutality through organized demonstrations in cities across Egypt. The protests 
grew larger, and eventually developed in thousands of protesters occupying Tahrir Square 
(Brynen, et al., 2012:24).  
On the 1st of February, Mubarrak promised vague political reforms and offered not to 
run again for office once his term had come to an end. This in return did not stabilize the 
situation and instead, resulted in clashes between pro-government supporters and anti-
government supporters. Subsequently, the Egyptian military had to step in to separate the two 
groups (Brynen, et al., 2012:24). Mubarak refused to step down, and the political elite 
increasingly started to see Mubarak as a liability to the regime. On 10th of February, he agreed 
to transfer some of his power to Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s intelligence chief, making him 
thus vice-president (Brynen et al., 2012:24). The very next day, Suleiman declared that 
Mubarak was leaving his presidential post and would be replaced the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF), who would have the task of managing the state´s affairs until new 
elections could be arranged (Gelvin, 2012:47).  
 
4.3 Tunisia: The Context 
Prior to the uprisings in 2011, Tunisia had only known two political leaders since 
gaining its independence in 1956. The first president was Habib Bourguiba, who ruled for 
thirty years from 1957 until 1987. Bourguiba was the leader of the Tunisian independence 
movement, and a year after Tunisia gained its independence from France, Bourguiba removed 
the county´s ruling monarch, King Muhammad VIII al-Amin, and declared Tunisia a republic 
(Gelvin, 2012:37). Bourguiba founded the Socialist Destourian Party from which he also 
became the leader, and following elections, he became president. In 1974, Bourguiba had the 




2012:18; Gelvin, 2012:37). However, in 1987, Bourguiba´s prime minister, Zine al-Abidine 
Ben Ali, initiated a coup to removed Bourguiba from power. Accordingly, Ben Ali became 
Tunisia´s second president and ruled for twenty-four years, from 1987 until 2011 (Brynen, et 
al., 2012:18).  
Ben Ali took over the presidency at a time of increasing labour unrest, and under a 
period of an emerging Islamic opposition (Brynen et al., 2012:18). One of his first acts as 
president was to dissolve the presidency-for-life decree that was implemented by Bourguiba, 
and amended the constitution to limit the number of terms a president could serve into three. 
This gave Tunisians hope, however, Ben Ali soon destroyed this hope by supporting a 
referendum that would annul the previous amendments that would make it acceptable for him 
to serve more terms (Gelvin, 2012:37-38). Furthermore, Ben Ali reformed Bourguiba´s party 
the Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) into the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), which 
made Tunisian believe that Ben Ali opened for competitive party politics. However, Ben Ali 
did just the opposite by strengthening the state coercive apparatus, co-opting different societal 
groups and cracking down on the moderate Islamist party Ennahda (Brynen et al., 2012:18). 
Throughout his presidency, Ben Ali was re-elected five times and got anywhere between 89 
and 98 percent of the vote with each election, which were far from being free and fair (Gelvin, 
2012:38). 
Gradually, Ben Ali´s regime became a political aberration to Tunisia´s growing middle 
class. His regime tortured critics, assaulted investigative journalists, imprisoned youth for 
bypassing Internet filters, and destroyed any pretence of judicial autonomy (Henry, 
2014:133). By 2010 the regime´s abuse and unfair treatment was obvious to Tunisians all 
over the country. The catalyst for Tunisia´s revolution was when the police harassed a 
Tunisian street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi on the 17th of December 2010. He 
attempted to submit a complaint that was eventually rejected and as a result he set himself on 
fire in protest. His actions made him an icon and set off an escalating series of anti-
government protests across all of Tunisia.  
A week after Bouazizi set himself on fire, Ben Ali visited him in the hospital in an 
effort to display compassion for his situation. He also transferred Bouazizi to a better hospital, 
and briefly arrested the police officer involved (Brynen et al., 2012:20). However, the 
protesters continued to spread to different cities in Tunisia, including the Tunisian capital, 




of their growing numbers. As a result, on the 14th of January 2011 Ben Ali fled Tunisia 
(Henry, 2014:133; Brynen et al., 2012:17; 19).  
In summary, the combination of single-party institutional legacies, the façade of multi-
party systems as well as a patronage-based economic privatization has contributed to the 
persistence of the authoritarian regimes in both Egypt and Tunisia. On the other hand, the 
economic inequality, corruption, cronyism and the lack of a political voice, were all 
fundamental factors that contributed to the social discontent that initiated and drove forward 
the uprisings in 2011 (Brynen et al., 2012:19).    
 
4.4 The State apparatus in Egypt and Tunisia before 2011 
Egypt and Tunisia has had a relatively autonomous pre-colonial rule, which has 
resulted in them becoming the two most developed states in region (Henry, 2014:127). Prior 
to the Arab uprisings in 2011, The Egyptian and Tunisian states redistributed its power 
through relatively autonomous administrative structures (Henry, 2014:130). Furthermore, the 
two countries experienced considerable growth in the state bureaucracy during the 1960s and 
70s. Overall the bureaucracy in Egypt grew from 18.3 percent in the 1955s to 37.9 percent in 
the 1970s. Similarly, in Tunisia the state bureaucracy grew from 20.7 percent in 1960 to 40.7 
percent in 1970 thereby doubling during the same decade (Owen, 2004: 23-25).  
Egypt and Tunisia also share a similarity with regard to the leading role assigned to 
the hegemonic party. During the early stage of state consolidation in each country, the 
dominant party were given a mobilizing role that eventually resulted in it becoming a 
patronage machine (Battera, 2014:550-551). In other words, the hegemonic party in both 
Egypt and Tunisia was utilized as an instrument to co-opt elites and obtain social control. The 
elections through multi-party systems introduced by the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes also 
lacked validity. The RCD in Tunisia for instance, retained control over the Tunisian 
parliament, which was similar to the NDP in Egypt (Battera, 2014:551).   
RCD and NDP had in both cases completely infiltrated society by rewarding loyal 
residents through resource redistribution. Neither party served a representative purpose, or 
identified with a specific ideology (Gelvin, 2012:39). Additionally, the opposition in both 
Egypt and Tunisia were controlled through co-optation.  In Tunisia, religious parties were 




certifying imams. The Egyptian government, on the other hand, coexisted with the religious 
establishment to a certain extent, and independent candidates affiliated with the MB were 
given restricted access to parliament (Battera, 2014:551). 
In summary, prior to the Arab uprisings in 2011, Egypt and Tunisia had strong, 
centralized bureaucracies in place. In both instances the hegemonic parties became hollow 
shells with the exclusive function of distributing patronage. As Gelvin (2012:39) so 
eloquently puts it: “Each (party, rem.) was more like a club whose board was composed of 
political and economic elites who divided political and economic spoils among themselves”.  
 
4.5 The Military in Egypt and Tunisia before 2011 
Authoritarian regimes depend upon a variety of institutions to provide them with their 
security needs. This includes numerous branches of the military, intelligence agencies, the 
police and often a praetorian guard (Bellin, 2012:130). This was exactly the case for Egypt 
and Tunisia prior to the uprisings in 2011, as both states established an extensive security 
apparatus to monitor, scare and repress citizens (Gelvin, 2012:39). Despite Egypt and 
Tunisia´s shared similarities with regards to the roles ascribed to the state bureaucracy and the 
party, there is an important difference in the respective role of the military.  
Since 1952, when Nasser and Free Officers abolished the monarchy and established a 
republic, the Egyptian military has maintained a privileged role in Egypt and remained a key 
part of the regime (Springborg, 2014:142; 146). As Richter (2007:83) states “Egyptian 
military forces are not only the guarantor of the country´s sovereignty but also the ultima ratio 
of its internal stability”. Moreover, the Egyptian military has a strong sense of corporatism 
and professionalism, which has been developed by the Egyptian regime, as a result of it 
providing the military with large military budgets, modernization programs, and other 
privileges (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). During his rule, Mubarak depended on the Egyptian 
military, and controlled them by generously giving his officers various economic rewards 
(Springborg, 2014:146). 
Unlike its Egyptian counterpart, the Tunisian military has always been kept at a 
distance from the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). In fact, the percentage of police officers 
outnumbered the military, which was due to Ben Ali and Bourguiba´s fear of military coups 




services (Anderson, 2011:3). As a result of this, throughout Bourguiba and Ben Ali´s rule the 
Tunisian military remained small in terms of size, its resources were limited, and officers 
were banned from politics (Brooks, 2013:209). However, the Tunisian military remained a 
part of the political coalition until the uprisings in 2011. Although one important aspect of the 
Tunisian military´s marginalization is that it allowed the military to sustain a corporate ethos 
that prioritized mission and duty and regard for the military as an institution (Brooks, 
2013:213).  
In sum, the Egyptian military was entrenched in the Egyptian regime; by contrast, the 
Tunisian military has had a long history of being marginalized, both militarily and politically. 
Therefore, in Egypt “the military ruled but did not govern” (Cook, 2007:8), whereas in 













Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis  
The following chapter consist of an empirical analysis, and is based on the hypotheses 
presented in chapter 2. The chapter will therefore examine each of the hypotheses 
systematically through empirical information to determine whether they can be proven or not. 
The hypotheses will be analysed within the time frame of when the authoritarian regimes 
were established until a new regime was established following the Arab uprisings. The 
authoritarian regime in Egypt was established in 1952 and 1957 in Tunisia (Gelvin, 2012:37).  
Subsequently this chapter will be structured as follows: The first section presents empirical 
evidence on the institutional autonomy between the state apparatus and the military during the 
revolution in Egypt and Tunisia. In order to do so, this section focuses on the military´s 
involvement within the country´s economy, and the state apparatus. The second section 
presents empirical evidence of the state apparatus and the military´s willingness to 
compromise with each other after the revolution. The third section, presents empirical 
evidence of the state apparatus and the military´s division during the revolution. To 
investigate this, the section will use military defection as an indicator for internal division 
within the ruling bloc.  
 
5.1 Institutional Autonomy  
This section will look at the institutional autonomy of the state apparatus and the 
military prior to the Arab uprisings. The interaction between the state apparatus and the 
military in Tunisia and Egypt played a crucial role in determining the outcome after the Arab 
uprisings. Scholars have attempted to explain the different outcomes that occurred following 
the Arab uprisings, and their studies have all pointed to the importance of the military and 
their role in society. The military has among other things, the monopoly of the means of 
legitimate violence and has proved to be the strongest institution (Battera, 2014:549). As 
such, no institution matters more to a regime´s survival than it’s military and their support 
(Barany, 2011:24). Subsequently, the military’s influence and power in relation to the 
remaining pillars of power, namely, the state and the party are vital to understand the different 
trajectory between Tunisia and Egypt following the uprisings. Therefore, in order to answer 
H1 I will focus on the military and their strength in society by concentrating on their influence 




the ruling party. These three aspects will indicate the weight of the army, which will in return, 
display whether or not the state apparatus and the military were autonomous prior to the 
uprisings in 2011.  
 
5.1.1 The Egyptian Military and the Economy 
Ever since 1952, when the Free Officers lead by lieutenant Gamal Abdel Nasser 
conducted a coup to overthrow the monarchy, the military has essentially been the backbone 
of the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). At the time when the Egyptian military seized power, 
they enjoyed broad popularity, and became the main instrument that steered the county into 
large-scale political, economic and social change (Droz-Vincent, 2007:196). Since the coup in 
1952, the Egyptian military and its civilian allies established political systems that favoured 
them at the expense of the remaining Egyptian society. To secure the new political order, the 
Egyptian military managed the advancement of political institutions that gave the appearance 
of pluralism but also included important mechanisms for oversight and political control 
(Cook, 2007:15).  The Egyptian military has thus, a long history of dominating state 
institutions in Egypt, and is still to this day a central source of power that is part of the 
regime.  
The Egyptian military´s influence over politics and the economic sector is hidden from 
public view. Generally, during periods of political crisis such as the Arab uprisings, the 
military elite has a tendency to revealing itself and their power position (Cook, 2007:15).  
This is exactly the case for the Egyptian military as there is strong evidence that demonstrates 
its involvement within the political and economic arena. This is because the Egyptian 
military´s core interests lies in the economy as well as the state apparatus (Cook, 2007:18). In 
this section I will present empirical evidence relating to the military´s involvement in Egypt´s 
economic sector.  
In the 1970s, when Anwar Sadat assumed power, a linkage between private economic 
interests and the military developed. Sadat´s policy of infitah, which was a policy of “opening 
the door” to private investment, permitted members of the military and the economic elite to 
jointly benefit from the spoils (Cook, 2007:19). Sadat´s infitah policy was not only a tactical 
effort to secure political support from the country´s private sector but also an effort to 




intended to promote structural economic change it was, however, quickly used to set in place 
large networks of domestic patronage (Cook, 2007:19). 
Over the years, the Egyptian military has accumulated a profitable portion of Egypt´s 
commercial and industrial sectors, and diverse cooperative ventures with domestic and 
foreign manufactures. Hence, they started to invest in the civilian sector, thereby becoming 
business actors in their own right (Cook, 2007:19;Droz-Vincent, 2007:201). This was in fact 
an important factor that ensured the Egyptian military´s allegiance to Mubarak´s regime. 
Hence, Mubarak awarded the Egyptian military with direct and indirect economic privileges 
(Springborg: 2014:146). This was also a tactical move on Mubarak´s part as it would ensure 
that the military would remain in the barracks as well as reduce the possibility of a military 
coup (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18).  
To this day, the military institution in Egypt owns a “vast military-run commercial 
enterprise that seeps into every corner of Egyptian society” (Stier, 2011). The military run 
businesses have a hold over a wide range of important industries in Egypt, and includes 
producing food, the manufacture of weapons, electronics, consumer goods, and infrastructure 
development. The profit from these ventures goes straight to the military´s coffers and is 
distributed without state oversight (Barany, 2011:28). Another important economic source for 
the Egyptian military was public land, which is valued commodity in Egypt, and is 
transformed into gated communities and tourist resorts (Stier, 2011).   
In an article published by the New York Times, the former minister of trade, Rashid 
Muhammad Rashid who is now in exile estimates that the Egyptian´s military empire is less 
than 10 percent (Kirkpatrick, 2011). However, some economists estimate that the military 
controls anywhere from 5 to 40 percent of the Egyptian economy (Gelvin, 2012:62). Yet no 
one knows exactly how much of the portion of Egypt´s 210 billion dollar economy the 
Egyptian military controls as this is a state secret (Gelvin, 2012:62; Stier: 2011). One thing is 
for certain, the Egyptian military´s economy is among the largest in the Arab region, and as a 
result, has become Egypt´s most important economic entity (Springborg, 2014:146; Cook: 
2007:19).  
The Egyptian military officers are also privileged in several ways. Frist, officers can buy real 
estate at subsidized prices. Second, domestic and imported goods are accessible for military 




and Wurzel, 1998:192). Fourth, health care, recreational, and retirement facilities were 
created and are more or less free for the officers (Springborg, 1989:4). Fifth, military 
personnel are offered profitable jobs in the public sector after retirement (Weiss and Wurzel: 
1998:192). When retired, favoured generals could also become highly paid “consultants” to 
the government ministries, banks and businesses (Lesch, 2014:65). Finally, the Egyptian 
military does not pay taxes or need to deal with bureaucratic red tape that strangles the private 
sector (Stier, 2011). 
 As demonstrated above, the Egyptian military essentially maintained a reserved 
private domain in the Egyptian economy, which meant that they had a decisive influence on 
the economic policies that were determined by the government. At the time when the Arab 
uprisings occurred, the Egyptian military enjoyed autonomy from Mubarak´s regime, 
however, the same cannot be said for the Egyptian economy. At the beginning of the crisis, 
the Egyptian economy was fused together with the military apparatus. For this reason the 
Egyptian military was willing to protect its corporate interests against any attempts to 
dismantle it (Hashim, 2011:109).  
 
5.1.2 The Egyptian Military and the State Apparatus 
According to Perlmutter (1969:383) “a modern praetorian state is one in which the 
military tends to intervene and could potentially dominate the political system”. This type of 
state usually develops in countries where civilian institutions either lack legitimacy or are in a 
position to be dominated by the military. Moreover, Perlmutter holds that the political 
processes in praetorian states will favour the advancement of the military as a core group, and 
its political leadership will predominantly be recruited from the military institution 
(1969:383). Egypt fits nicely into Perlmutter´s definition of a praetorian state. Ever since the 
Egyptian military overthrew the monarchy in 1952, Egyptian presidents have based their rule 
on the institutional power of the military, and the Egyptian military has maintained a 
privileged role in society (Springborg, 2014:151). Additionally, before the election of 
Mohamed Morsi in 2012 following the uprisings, each of Egypt´s presidents have been 
selected from the officer corps (Norton, 2013:338).  
When Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the Free Officers seized power in 1952 and up until 




(Harb, 2003:270). The reason for this was because the important role that the Egyptian 
military played in Egyptian society. The military brought Nasser to power and ultimately 
became a symbol of revolutionary change in the newly established Egyptian republic (Brooks, 
2013:209). Nasser´s regime controlled the government, political processes, and banned all 
political parties soon after taking over. Under Nasser, the Egyptian military´s role was to 
protect the regime and participate in government. The cabinet, ministries, and state apparatus 
were all staffed with military personnel. Hence, ever since Egypt´s first president came to 
power, the Egyptian military and army officers formed the core of the ruling elite, and 
retained a privileged position in Egyptian society (Harb, 2003: 276; 278-79).  
After Nasser´s death in 1970, Sadat succeeded the presidency, and brought about 
radical ideological and practical changes to the Egyptian regime (Harb, 2003:282). He 
implemented the infitah policy (political liberalization), thereby creating a democratic façade 
that became more institutionalized and sophisticated. Sadat also introduced multi-party 
elections in 1976 (Michalik, 2005:80). However, the regime´s decision to hold multi-party 
elections were not a threat to the Egyptian military´s interests. Cook (2007:16) argues that the 
Egyptian military has a clear hierarchy of interests where regime survival is at the top, and as 
a result, when Egypt moved from a single party to a multi-party system, the military did not 
object because Sadat´s institutional changes reinforced the overall stability of the regime.   
A consequence of the implementation of a multi-party system was that Egypt´s 
parliament included an array of political parties in 1980. The ruling regime allowed limited 
access to parliament to independent candidates linked with the Muslim Brotherhood (Battera, 
2014:551). However, the Egyptian military retained and refined the means of political control 
through restrictive electoral laws, poll rigging, suppression of the media (Cook, 2007:26). The 
opposition parties in Egypt only served as a front, giving an illusion of a multi-party system in 
order to conceal the reality of a dominant-party regime where the dominant party was the 
regime´s party, namely, the NDP (Albrecht: 2005:384). The hegemonic party, NDP for 
example, was not a threat to the military because the parliament had increasingly become an 
extension of the executive branch. According to Cook (2007:70): 
“The presidency remains the crucial institutional mechanism of the military establishment’s 
political influence. As a result, engineering the dominance of the NDP was (and remains) a 
means through which the leadership of Egypt’s military-dominated state sought to ensure both 




Accordingly, a separation between the party and the army occurred under Sadat, however, the 
establishment of a dominant party structure through elections served the overall interests of 
the regime, and as a result the interests of the military as well (Blaydes, 2008:24). Therefore, 
although the Egyptian military´s role within the party was reduced, their interests remained 
intact, and still had great power through the executive branch, which provided them with 
benefits and opportunities that essentially served their interests.  
When Sadat was assassinated in 1981, his vice-president, Hosni Mubarak succeeded 
the presidency. Mubarak was a former air force commander and drawn from the officer corps 
when he became vice-president to Sadat (Brynen et al., 2012:22). Under Mubarak, the 
majority of Egypt´s 26 governors were senior-ranking military and police officers, and 
although they were removed from their posts, they remained integrated within the Egyptian 
military. Their role consisted of protecting the local and regional level from opposition 
activists from engaging in activities that would threaten the incumbent regime´s political 
control and democratic façade (Cook, 2007: 26). Hence, the Egyptian regime was not just 
Mubarak´s regime; it was also a military regime where generals and retired generals 
controlled a lot of the government (Alterman, 2011).  
Subsequently, at the beginning of the political crisis following the Arab uprisings in 
Egypt, the separation of the Egyptian military from the party and the state was, incomplete. 
Although the party was kept separate from the military, there was no clear separation between 
the military and the state with regards to political control. This is because members of the 
military were part of the government through official functions and local power. The military 
for instance, controlled the presidency as well as the Ministry of Defence (Battera, 2014:552). 
Although the liberalization that occurred under Sadat had reduced the army´s control over the 
party, it gained at the same time power to control the state indirectly. The Egyptian military 
also took responsibility over the redistributive capacities that were previously administered by 
the state (Battera, 2014:552). This was partly because of the military´s connection with 
external resources provided by the United Sates in military aid (Richter, 2007:184).  
Since the Free Officer´s coup in 1952, the Egyptian presidents, Nasser, Sadat and 
Mubarrak have used the military as a base for legitimacy and power. The military has and still 
continues to be, the key to Egyptian politics because it provides the power base for the 
president and protection for the regime (Harb, 2003:282; 287). From Nasser to Mubarak, the 




However, the Egyptian military has come to enjoy the democratic institutions as it has 
protected them from politics in that public dissatisfaction is directed at other institutions, 
which allowed the military to focus on their own core interests (Cook, 2003: 15; Blaydes, 
2008:24). Mubarak and his presidential predecessors, Nasser and Sadat were not only 
presidents; they were also leading members of Egypt´s military. As such, they continuously 
protected the Egyptian military´s interests and ensured the dominance and advancement of the 
military institution in Egypt (Harb, 2003:287).   
In sum, the relationship between the military and the Egyptian state apparatus prior to 
the uprisings was one of cooperation. The regime protected the Egyptian military´s corporate 
and individual interests and in exchange the military used its competence and power to 
support the regime. The Egyptian military and its allies, thus created a political system with 
full-fledged democratic facades, which in return allowed the military elite to rule, and leaving 
it to others to govern (Cook, 2007: 26). Subsequently, when the Arab uprisings reached Egypt 
in 2011, the military had considerable influence over the Egyptian economy and the state 
apparatus. As a result of this, the state apparatus and the military were not autonomous of 
each other. This made a democratic transition in Egypt difficult, as the military were invested 
in the regime status quo, since their interests were tied to the regime.  
 
5.1.3 The Tunisian Military and the Economy 
 Unlike the Egyptian military, the Tunisian military did not have extensive economic 
businesses ventures, and the officers did not have the same type of access to the private sector 
when they retired (Brooks, 2013: 210). This goes back to Tunisia´s independence as the 
country´s separation from France was rather free of conflict, and as a result, there were no 
need for the military´s involvement (Sorenson, 2007:106). Tunisia´s first president, 
Bourguiba and his successor Ben Ali essentially excluded the military from any political 
involvement. They were not allowed to vote, and were banned from joining any political 
parties (Sorenson, 2007:107; Barany, 2011:27).   
As such, because of their diminished role form the outset, especially in politics; the Tunisian 
military had no power to dominate the domestic economy (Anderson, 2011:3). As Springborg 
states (2011:398): “Tunisia´s military was essentially placed on ice by former president Bin 
`Ali – and was weak even under Bourguiba – so it had no access to significant resources even 




Under Ben Ali, the military budget was small, which for 2006 only consisted of 1.4 
percent of the national GDP (Sorenson, 2007:107). The Tunisian military´s equipment was 
also outdated, and mainly consists of old weapons: around 140 tanks, some patrol boats as 
well as a few helicopters (Brooks, 2013:210; Sorenson, 2007:107). In fact, during Ben Ali´s 
rule there have been very limited upgrades to the Tunisian military´s equipment in general 
(Sorenson, 2007:107). In other words, both under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, they did not rely 
upon the military, and as a result Ben Ali built what would in the following two decades 
become a security state.  
According to WikiLeaks, in 2006 the former US ambassador in Tunisia, William 
Hudson reported on the disproportionate power and influence that was controlled by a few of 
Tunisia´s elites. These elites mainly consisted of Tunisia´s first family, namely, Ben Ali and 
people personally related to him through his wife, children and siblings (WikiLeaks, 2006). 
Hudson also claims that their power and influence is rumoured to include all the major sectors 
of the economy, but is however, difficult to accurately measure (WikiLeaks, 2006). In other 
words, it was Ben Ali and his family that effectively ruled Tunisia though personalist ties, 
therefore it was they that controlled the economy, and not the military, which is in stark 
contrast to Egypt.  
Ben Ali had tight control over the Tunisian military, and after the retirement of 
General el-Kateb in 1991, he refused to choose a new chief of staff for the military. This 
denied the Tunisian military a general that could coordinate the military, the navy and the air 
force. Instead, Ben Ali took on this role himself and made decisions regarding the Tunisian 
military himself (Grewal, 2016). Hence, Ben Ali exercised personal rule over the Tunisian 
military. Unlike most the other military establishments in the Arab world, the Tunisian 
military has never attempted any military coups, neither has it enforced any political 
decisions, or been an instrument of nation building (Ware, 1985:37). Most importantly, it has 
never joined in any economic development schemes (Barany, 2011:27). The Tunisian military 
was intentionally kept small, underfunded and marginalized.  
In sum, the Tunisian military did not have any influence over the Tunisian economy.  
It was not privileged nor did it have any advantages as it´s Egyptian counterparts. The 
Tunisian military did not own any businesses, and as a result no economic stakes in the 





5.1.4 The Tunisian Military and the State Apparatus 
A year after Tunisia gained its independence from France, Habib Bourguiba, who was 
the leader of Tunisia´s independence movement, removed its monarch and declared Tunisia a 
republic (Gelvin, 2012:37).  Bourguiba thus assumed power in 1956 as head of the PSD that 
would later become the county´s dominant political party. However, unlike Egypt, the 
military did not play an important role in the state apparatus. This is because the Tunisian 
military did not bring Bourguiba or his regime to power. Second, it did not play a leading role 
as a symbol of revolutionary change in the newly established Tunisian republic (Brooks, 
2013:209).   
In fact, when Bourguiba assumed power, he had a specific idea of the military´s role in 
the state in that it would play a little to no role in politics (Brooks, 2013:209). During his three 
decades long rule from 1957 up until 1987, he banned the officer corps from joining the 
ruling party (Barany, 2011:27).  This in return, thus prevented them from having access to 
institution of elite politics in Tunisia. The Tunisian military was also purposely kept small in 
size and in terms of resources (Brooks, 2013:209). Bourguiba also denied the military a role 
in eliminating rebels, thereby distancing them from coercive functions. Instead, he relied upon 
the Interior Ministry as well as the police and other security forces to take on that role. For 
that reason the Tunisian military never participated in the decision-making process as a 
political elite. Instead, the Tunisian military served as the defenders of national sovereignty, 
the status quo and as a symbol of unity (Ware, 1985:37).   
The police and other forces that were controlled by the Interior Ministry mainly 
provided the security in Tunisia. As a result, the Tunisian military did not operate in Tunis, 
instead they played a policing role in the countryside and smaller cities (Brooks, 2013: 211). 
In 1978 and 1984 the military helped the government to restore order following civil 
disruptions. However, the generals disliked having to assume police functions (Barany, 
2011:27). Consequently, ever since the late 1970s, the Tunisian military has started to 
recognize their disadvantage in relation to the civilian bureaucracy (Ware, 1985:39). The 
Tunisian military held the bureaucrats of the Interior Ministry responsible for the 
relinquishment of their duty. Therefore, mistrust between the military and the Interior 
Ministry developed, where the military believed that the civilian bureaucracy could not cope 




In 1987, Prime Minister Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who had climbed the ranks of the 
military before starting his political career, had doctors declare Bourguiba mentally 
incompetent, as Bourguiba´s health and erratic behaviour became increasingly serious 
(Gelvin, 2012:37; Brooks, 2013:210). This was a coup, and in accordance with the 
constitution, Ben Ali then became president (Gelvin, 2012:37). Once in power, Ben Ali 
banned Islamist parties and secured the ruling party, the RCD control of almost all the seats in 
parliament (Lesch, 2014:64). He also continued with Bourguiba´s strategy with regards to the 
military, keeping it small and marginalized, while at the same time, financing security forces 
that grew increasingly (Brooks, 2010:210). The reason why both Ben Ali and Bourguiba 
before him, wanted the army to remain small in terms of size was because they feared a 
possible coup d´état. As a result, the proportion of police officers was much higher than that 
of the military personnel in Tunisia, which is in stark contrast to Egypt (Battera, 2014:550).   
According to Brooks, one important after effect of the Tunisian military´s 
marginalization and its dismissal to the periphery, is that it allowed the military some degree 
of organizational autonomy. Subsequently, the military managed to maintain a “corporate 
ethnos” that promoted mission, duty as well as respect for the military as an institution 
(2010:213). In other words, the exclusion of the military from daily regime preservation, 
limited their vulnerability to the bias and varied incentives that could occur if they had 
participated in elite politics and patronage networks within the state, as had happened to the 
Egyptian military. In addition, as the military did not have any influence over the party or the 
state, this in return became an advantage for them. For example under the Arab uprisings in 
2011, the military was not seen as being part of the coercive apparatus in the manner that the 
police and other security forces were (Brooks, 2010:214).  
Under Ben Ali, Tunisia was essentially a police state where the military was obscured 
by larger, more generously funded and more politically influential security agencies that were 
run by the Interior Ministry (Barany, 2011:27). Ben Ali also sent many of his military officers 
for training in the US, which in return, introduced them to programs on the principles of civil-
military relations under democracy. As a result of the ban on military officers to join politics 
as well as its low budget and equipment, the Tunisian military eventually ranked among the 
Arab world´s most professional forces (Barany, 2011:27). In addition, the Tunisian army had 
no stakes in the regimes survival as they were not involved in the state apparatus, nor did they 




In summary, Ben Ali´s strategy towards the Tunisian military was control through 
exclusion by keeping the military isolated from the regime, and balancing it with an extensive 
police and security apparatus (Brooks, 2010:211). Contrary to its Egyptian counterpart, who´s 
power base was the military, Ben Ali´s power base lay in the security apparatus that he 
founded and expanded. The small Tunisian military remained outside of politics and 
developed a reputation for integrity (Lesch, 2014:62). However, the professionalization of the 
Tunisian military implied that its role as one of the pillars of the coalitions was preserved, and 
had been an integral part of the regime up until the uprisings in 2011 (Battera, 2014:551). In 
2011 when the Arab uprisings occurred in Tunisia, the Tunisian military did not have any 
considerable influence over the Tunisian economy and state apparatus. Subsequently, the state 
apparatus and the military were autonomous of each other, which facilitated a democratic 
transition in Tunisia. This was because of the military had no interest tied to the regime.  
 
5.1.5 Does institutional autonomy increase the probability of democratization?  
The first hypothesis is: 
 “The more autonomous the state apparatus and the military are from each other, in an 
authoritarian regime, the higher the probability of democratization”.  
I argue that the empirical evidence presented above supports H1. The analysis 
conducted on the institutional autonomy of the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and 
Tunisia prior to the uprisings has demonstrated that the institutional structures in two cases 
were different. As demonstrated, the military in Egypt were very strong as they had 
considerable influence over the economy and the state apparatus. The military, essentially 
ruled but did not govern, and has had a long history of dominating state institutions. Thus, the 
state apparatus and the military in Egypt were essentially fused together when the Arab 
uprisings occurred, which basically made a democratic transition impossible. This was largely 
due to the fact that the Egyptian military had built its very own economic empire through 
various business ventures. Hence, the Egyptian military had the most to lose from a 
democratic transition, and as a result, they interfered in the transition to protect their interests. 
In Tunisia on the other hand, the military was very weak as it was largely marginalized by the 
regime. The military were excluded from the economic sector, and kept separate from the 




other when the Arab uprisings occurred, which facilitated a democratic transition. This will be 
discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
5.2 Institutions and their ability to compromise  
This section will explore the state apparatus and the military´s willingness to 
compromise following the Arab uprisings. Compromise is an integral part of politics. This is 
particularly the case for countries that undergoing a transition process such as Egypt and 
Tunisia. As argued by Al Ramiah and Hewstone (2012:303): “Compromise is an important 
component in negotiating and settling differences in a range of social spheres, including those 
involving political actors”. Therefore, to answer H2 I will focus on whether or not the state 
apparatus, and the military were able to compromise with each other during the transition. 
However, there will be a greater emphasis on main Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia as 
these are at the centre of the transition process.  
 
5.2.1 Post-Revolutionary Egypt: Divide and Mistrust  
The continued power of the old regime following the Arab uprisings is most apparent 
in Egypt. In response to the uprising in Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) formed a transitional government, and removed Mubarak from office. For the 
Egyptian military, this was essentially a means to resist civilian budgetary oversight, which 
was accomplished by maintaining the old regime with small adjustments (Landolt and 
Kubicek, 2014:996). Once the transitional government was in place, the Generals insisted that 
the Egyptian military´s economic and political privileges should stay unchallenged (Norton, 
2013:339). During SCAF´s rule, no considerable institutional reforms occurred, and most of 
the political power remained within the remnants of the old regime (Landolt and Kubicek, 
2014:996). In fact, not only did the military´s role continue unhindered following Mubarak´s 
removal, but also other key institutions power remained intact (Norton, 2013:338). 
As a result, when SCAF took over as the interim government following Mubarak´s 
ouster, they reinforced the old system that was already in place during Mubarak´s rule (El 
Amrani, 2013:100). For example, the Ministry of Interior that controlled the police as well as 




many remnants of the old regime remained after the uprising that swept across Egypt.  In fact, 
around five million Egyptians worked for the government, including a large group of security 
forces that were all committed to controlling the political arena, uncover rebels, and remove 
challenges to the state (Norton, 2013:338). Consequently, the internal security apparatus was 
mostly unaffected by the revolution. Similarly, patron-client networks that linked the regime 
to economic elites remained for the most part intact (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996).  
When Mubarak was removed from office, opponents of the regime were split over the 
issue of who should take over as well as how the transition should occur (Landolt and 
Kubicek, 2014:996). It is important to note that under Mubarak´s rule there was a clear 
absence of non-Islamist political parties as any secular political parties that could pose a threat 
to Mubarak´s regime was repressed and intimidated (Norton, 2013:339). Some liberal, 
nationalist, leftist and issue-orientated parties were however, allowed to legally function 
under Mubarak. Nevertheless, as Norton (2013:339) puts it they often: “[…] seemed more 
like political boutiques than groups with a significant base in society”. Yet, Mubarak and his 
regime allowed the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to participate in politics by allowing them to 
run as independent candidates, thereby giving them limited access to parliament (Battera, 
2014:551). This was more of a tactic on Mubarak´s in that he divided the Islamist opposition 
in suppressing radicals but allowing the MB to participate (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996).    
Although the MB and secular political parties had incentives to cooperate with each 
other following Mubarak’s fall, there were various factors that hindered this. Firstly, there 
was a presence of mutual suspicion between them. Secondly, the MB was willing to 
accommodate the remnants of the old regime. Finally, the MB had contradictory positions on 
political reform (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:996).  Consequently, they were not able to build 
a pro-democracy coalition.  Subsequently, the MB, secular and liberal regime opponents 
competed to influence SCAF, which resulted in a complex trichotomous game between 
Islamists, SCAF and secularists that was advantageous to the interim government (El Amrani, 
2013:101). The MB was the only political party that was powerful enough to obtain a degree 
of “normalization” in Egypt and fill the political vacuum (El Amrani, 2013:101; Landolt and 
Kubicek, 2014:997).  
During the Mubarak era, the MB earned respect from the people for their distribution 
of essential services to poor and for their religiousness, which concurred with the religious 




SCAF´s willingness to collaborate as well as the MB´s mistrust of secular and liberal regime 
opponents, the MB decided to work with SCAF, as they believed that this would increase 
their political power. For them this was the best alternative as working with the secular and 
liberal opponents was an uncertain path (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:997). Consequently, the 
MB obtained a transitional plan that favoured them instead of their secular and liberal 
opponents (El Amrani, 2013:101).  
Evidence of collaboration between the MB and SCAF can be found when SCAF 
appointed a commission to draft transitional constitutional revisions, which included Subhi 
Salih, a former member of parliament and affiliated with the MB. However, the commission 
did not include any representatives from secular parties or revolutionary youth groups (El 
Amrani: 2013:101). The result of the Constitutional Declaration that was approved on March 
19th 2011 was the new constitution, was to be written by a constitutional assembly selected by 
parliament after the elections. This was a clear advantage for the MB because their superior 
numbers and organization made them likely to succeed and as a result they expected to win. 
The MB was successful in advocating a “yes” for the referendum, and the “yes” side of the 
referendum got 79 percent of the vote (El Amrani: 2013:101).  
Before the parliamentary elections, the MB assured SCAF as well as other regime 
opponents that they were not going to establish an Islamic government. In order to reassure 
them of this they promised not to seek parliamentary majority, dominate the constitutional 
assembly or have candidate run for president (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:997). However, 
when parliamentary elections were held in November 2011, the newly formed Freedom and 
Justice Party (FJP) that represented the MB won the elections with 45 percent thereby 
obtaining nearly half of the seats. The Nour Party, which represented the ultra-conservative 
Salafis, took 22 percent of the vote, secular liberals and leftist parties won 16 percent. Finally, 
parties with ties to Mubarak managed to win 5 percent of the vote (Al Jazeera, 2012).  
Parliamentary elections were held in November 2011, and the result illustrated the 
weakness of the non-Islamist political parties. In contrast to the MB, the secular and liberal 
political parties did not have social and economic networks, and were divided amid various 
new parties (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:997). After winning the parliamentary elections the 
MB went back on their word, and essentially increased their power with the caretaker 
government at the expense of a coalition with secular/ liberal regime opponents as well as a 




In January 2012, clashes occurred outside the parliamentary headquarters between MB 
supporters and anti-SCAF protesters. Supporters of the MB chanted, “the army and the people 
are in one hand” while establishing a human shield around parliament. Anti-SCAF protesters 
on the other hand chanted against the MB, and accused them of abandoning the revolution by 
cooperating with SCAF, and refusing the early handover of power to Parliament (Ibrahim: 
2012). In reaction to this, the leader of the MB, Mohamed Badie published an editorial to 
assure democratic activists that their interests would not be disregarded in the constitutional 
assembly: 
“We seek to build a modern, democratic state on the basis of co-citizenship, the rule of 
law, freedom, equality and pluralism in all forms, as well as the peaceful rotation of 
power through ballot box and respect for human rights. We seek a state based on 
freedom, justice and equality for all citizens, without discrimination based on creed, 
colour or faith. We seek to forge a new constitution that meets the demands of the 
people… with the understanding that national charters are written by consensus – not 
simply by majority” (Badie: 2012) 
However, Badie´s statement was contradictory, in that the constitutional assembly 
elected by the MB dominating parliament did not represent divergent interests in Egyptian 
society. In fact, out of the 100 members in the constitutional assembly, 64 of had Islamist 
connections. As a result, 25 non-Islamists members resigned in protest (Landolt and Kubicek: 
2014:998). This also highlights the fact that the MB broke the second promise they made to 
SCAF and the secular/liberal regime opponents, namely, not to dominate the constitutional 
assembly.  
After promising that the MB would not put forth presidential candidates, the 
leadership within the party did exactly the opposite. Mohamed Morsi who was well known 
outside of MB circles became the party´s presidential candidate. During this time, he was the 
chairman of the FJP, which was created by the MB in 2011 (Norton, 2013:340). Because of 
the lack of success in organizing a pro-democratic coalition before the first round of the 
presidential elections, secular and Islamist democracy advocates divided their votes between 
Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi, Islamist liberal Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh and the human 
rights lawyer, Khaled Ali. Together these three candidates received 40 percent of the vote 




The final round of the presidential elections offered voters an unsavoury choice 
between Ahmed Shafik a fomer commanding general of the air force who was named prime 
minister under Mubarak, or Mohamed Morsi, who represented an organization which had 
previously been illegal (Norton, 2013:340). At the same time, SCAF still maintained 
executive power, and from behind the scenes they pushed for the election of Ahmed Shafik 
(Lesch, 2014:66). However, Morsi won the presidential elections with 51 percent of the vote, 
and subsequently, in June 2012, SCAF unwillingly let go of their power (Lesch, 2014:66). 
The conflict between secular/liberal regime opposition and the MB over who should 
assume power and how the transition should take place was dragged to the court. The 
Supreme Constitutional Courts (SCC) was not dissolved by SCAF following the Uprisings, 
and it is noteworthy that all the judges were Mubarak appointees who were used to seeing the 
MB as an illegal group with motives that were contradictory to Egypt´s interests (Landolt and 
Kubicek, 2014:998; Norton, 2013:341). In June 2012, the same month as Morsi´s 
inauguration, the SCC ruled in favour of the MB´s secular opponents, and stated that the 
parliamentary election law was unconstitutional. The SCC ruled that parliament should be 
dissolved and mandated new elections (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:998). 
On the 22nd of November 2012, Morsi issued a presidential decree that essentially 
would give him extensive powers as well as judicial immunity. The argument for this was that 
it was necessary to protect the democratic transition (Norton, 2013:340; Landolt and Kubicek, 
2014:999). Morsi also tried reconciliatory gestures towards the opposition by offering 
dialogue, however, this proved ineffective, as the majority of the opposition was not 
interested. It was during this time that the military started to involve itself in politics by 
undermining Morsi and openly support the opposition’s demands that he annulled the 
presidential decree, which Morsi did in early December 2012 (Norton, 2013:342).  
Popular opposition to Morsi increased as many felt that the MB was not interested in 
sharing power but quite contrarily wanted to seize it. This intensified after the constitutional 
referendum in December 2012. The new constitution was approved where about two thirds of 
the voters approved the draft. However, this new constitution included articles to preserve the 
autonomy of the military, protect its budget from civilian overview as well as enable military 
courts to try civilians (Norton, 2013:342).  On June 30th 2013 citizens turned up for anti-
Morsi demonstrations across Egypt. Consequently, the defence minister and commander of 




reach a compromise with the opposition. Morsi in return, remained stubborn insisted on his 
own legitimacy. Finally, on the 3rd of July 2013 the Egyptian military carried out a coup, 
putting the military in power once again (Norton, 2013:343).  
In summary, the Egyptian case highlights that although the uprising that occurred in 
Egypt managed to remove Mubarak, many of the remnants of the old regime persisted, which 
included bureaucrats, judges and military officers. As the remnants of the old regime endured 
in Egypt, it made it difficult for the opposition to form a coalition as the remnants worked 
tirelessly to pit them against each other. This is seen in the trichotomous game between 
SCAF, Islamist and the secular opponents in Egypt. Mistrust between the MB and secular 
opponents made it difficult for them to work together for a successful democratic transition. 
In addition, the MB broke all the promises they made to their opponents with regards to not 
seeking parliamentary majority, not dominating the constitutional assembly or having a 
candidate run for presidency. None of their actions demonstrated willingness to compromise, 
instead the MB appeared to seek inclusion with the ruling caretaker government in order to 
advance their political power at the expense of secular and liberal groups.   
The MB essentially isolated itself politically, and when they won the parliamentary 
elections as well as the presidential elections they had few incentives to undertake reforms to 
disperse and share power, which is an important factor if a democracy is to be established. 
Instead of opening a dialogue with the opposition, both the MB, and later on the seculars 
stuck to polarizing positions that prevented any meaningful consensus building (Lesch: 
2014:68). Additionally, as Egypt was previously characterized by non-competitive elections 
the parties were unable to acquire a democratic track record. The MB, which was allowed to 
operate to some degree in Egyptian society under Mubarak, had experience as an opposition 
party and no experience to rule the country. All in all, as Landolt and Kubicek (2014:997) 
states: “The MB chose the devil it knew by working with the SCAF to augment political 
power rather than the more uncertain path of joining secular/liberal regime opponents to 
demand meaningful regime change”.  
 
5.2.2 Post-Revolutionary Tunisia: Cooperation and Compromise 
In contrast to Egypt, remnants of the old regime in Tunisia lost their power after the 
uprising.  Following Ben Ali ouster in 2011, his allies attempted to exploit the weakness of 




the previously banned opposition parties (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:991). This resulted in 
substantial protests by numerous groups that responded by forming a Council for the 
Protection of the Revolution, which included professional organizations, students, trade 
unions and Islamists. This council forced many of Ben Ali´s allies to resign from the initial 
interim government. In February 2011, lawyer and high-profiled Ben Ali critic, Beji Caid 
Essebsi, became the interim prime minister. During his time as prime minister, he founded a 
High Commission whose purpose was to realize the revolutionary goals. The High 
Commission consisted of 170 members, and was intended to be an inclusive forum to 
implement demands of the people (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:991-2).  
In stark contrast to Egypt, the Tunisian interim government dissolved old institutions, and 
instead formed new ones.  Institutions, which included members of the old regime such as the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Constitutional Court, were dissolved. Subsequently, in March 
2011, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), which was Ben Ali´s former party, was 
banned. All its assets were seized and the party´s elite was banned from ever running for 
political office (Landolt and Kubicek: 2014:994). Several of Ben Ali´s allies also faced legal 
charges that consisted of everything from corruption to murder. Both Ben Ali and his wife 
were also charged and convicted (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:994). 
Tunisia´s transition process started by electing a constituent assembly on the 23rd of 
October 2011 that would be responsible for forming the government as well as writing a new 
constitution. Subsequently, over a 100 parties registered to participate, and most of them came 
from political parties that had previously been repressed by Ben Ali (Lesch, 2014: 67-8; 
Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:992). Most noteworthy, was the return of the leaders of Ennahda, 
which was a moderate Islamist party that was banned under Ben Ali. Ennahda was able to 
quickly build up a support networks, and won the country´s first free elections (Landolt and 
Kubicek: 2014:992; Cavatorta and Merone, 2013: 857). Ennahda won the elections with far 
more votes than any other party, claiming 40 percent of the seats thereby taking 90 seats out 
of 217 for the constituent assembly. The remaining seats were divided between several large 
secular parties (Churchill, 2011).   
After the election, Ennahda formed a three-party coalition government with the next two 
leading parties following the elections, which were both secular leftist parties: Congress for 
the Republic Party (CPR) and Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties Pary (Ettakatol) 




general secretary, Hamzadi Jebali became Prime Minister. Moncef Marzouki from CPR 
became president, and finally, Mustapha Ben Jaafar from Ettakatol became Speaker of the 
Assembly. Together these three parties constituted a democratic coalition, as all three 
promised to advance democratic reforms (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:992).  
This coalition government were to rule for one year while the constitutional assembly 
would complete its work thereby new elections would be held. Through their power sharing 
agreement, the coalition accomplished early cooperation, especially in removing the 
remaining actors from the old regime. Yet, splits surfaced within the coalition government on 
February 2012, after the constitutional assembly started its work. These divisions included 
issues on the outline of political institutions, as well as the role of Islam. In order to reach a 
consensus, Ennahda´s position evolved over time. Among other things, Ennahda discussed, 
whether or not to include an explicit reference to sharia, how to define the status of women, 
and the institutional design of the political system (Marks, 2014:20; 26). 
 In the spring of 2012, Ennahda members discussed whether or not to include a direct 
reference to Sharia in the constitution (Marks, 2014:20). As a sign of good will, Ennahda 
compromised by removing the adoption of Sharia Law (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:993). As 
it turned out, leaving the word Sharia out of the Constitution was not a big issue for many 
Ennahda members. The party´s elite had for a long time supported a looser view of Sharia, 
which prioritized abstract principles over specific rules. This in return helped to create a broad 
based consensus for not including the word (Marks, 2014:21).  
Ennahda’s stance on women´s rights came under scrutiny, this was particularly due to the 
wording of Article 28 in the first draft of the constitution. Article 28 said at the time “The 
state guarantees the protection of women and supports their achievements, considering them 
as men´s true partners in building the nation”. It further said: “Their roles complement one 
another within the family” (Marks, 2014:22-3). This reflected the view that men and women 
are equal under God, but that they have different biological roles and familial obligations, 
which in turn complement one another within the family (Marks, 2014:23). Article 28 was a 
critical failure for Ennahda as they failed in building trust at a time when they should do 
everything in their power to build confidence in handling women´s rights. As a result, 
Ennahda backtracked and reverted back to using the term equal instead of complementary. 




The issue from which Ennahda was most resistant to compromise on was the institutional 
design of Tunisia´s political system. The conflict was on whether Tunisia´s new political 
system should follow a presidential model, a parliamentary model or a combination of the 
two. Ennahda supported the parliamentary model by citing the importance of hindering 
Tunisia´s tendency towards presidential authoritarianism. In an interview, Jamila Jouini a 
member of Ennahda stated: “We have a history of strong men… a parliament can help stop 
that” (Marks, 2014:26). Ennahda´s opponents viewed Ennahda´s position on the institutional 
design of the political system as self-serving. In their view, Ennahda´s strong electoral 
position meant that they would naturally support a parliamentary system as their large 
numbers could give them more political power. In the end, Ennahda gave in to its opponents, 
in favour of a stronger presidential model similar to France. Tunisia´s Constitution has as a 
result, set up a mixed presidential- parliamentary system (Marks, 2014:27).   
One growing source of concern the opposition had with Ennahda was the fear that the 
latter would do anything in its power to obtain control over the government. This concern 
intensified when foreign minister Rafik Abdessalem stated with complete confidence that “the 
Ennahda Movement will continue to be in power for many years to come”. This fuelled public 
suspicion that the first elections since the revolution, which had already been delayed until 
June 2013, might be compromised (Al-Maliki, 2012). The head of the Ennahda movement, 
Rachid Ghannouchi, was quick to clarify Rafik Abdessalem´s statement the following day 
during a press conference. Ghannouchi stated, “the minister was trying to envisage a future 
and did not intend to impose control over Tunisians” (Al-Maliki, 2012).   
The fear that Ennahda was planning to rig the elections in order to obtain power did not 
come out of the blue as many, questioned Ennahda´s motives. This was particularly due to the 
fact that some Ennahda officials had made negative comments with regards to secularism and 
democracy in the past. Rachid Ghannouchi, for example, was in favour of Sharia law as well 
as an Iranian style Islamic Council to approve laws. However, following the revolution, 
Ennahda tried to reduce the concern that the party is anti-democratic or wanted to weaken the 
secular order that had characterized Tunisia since its independence in 1956  (Landolt and 
Kubicek, 2014:993).   
In an Interview with Marc Lynch for the magazine, Foreign Policy, Ghannouchi stated 
that: “Everyone in al-Nahda1 believes that democracy is the only way to reach power and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




stay in power”. Furthermore, when asked about Ennahda´s priorities, Ghannouchi stated: “We 
will guarantee that dictatorship will not come back to Tunis. We are for a parliamentary 
system, which no longer gives us a person with concentrated powers. Our utmost priority is to 
guarantee freedoms: personal freedoms, social freedoms, and women’s rights. We did not ask 
to add anything to the first article of the old Constitution, which says that Tunisia is an Arab 
and a Muslim country. And everyone seems to agree on this in Tunisia” (Lynch, 2011).  
Ever since winning the majority in the Constituent Assembly, Ennahda has been 
pragmatic in the sense of being willing to work with other parties by forming a national unity 
coalition. In the same interview with Foreign Policy, when asked about the coalition, 
Ghannouchi stated: “We have declared since before the elections that we would opt for a 
coalition government, even if al-Nahda achieves an absolute majority, because we don’t want 
the people to perceive that they have moved from a single party dominant in the political life 
to another single party dominating the political life” (Lynch, 2011). In this sense one could 
argue that in contrast to the MB and Egypt, Ennahda kept its promise to the Tunisian people, 
which in return could promote more trust with the opposition as well as the Tunisian people. 
In addition, Ennahda has rejected the prohibition of alcohol and bikinis by arguing that this 
would be unfavourable to the tourist sector (Landolt and Kubicek, 2014:993). Hence, 
Ennahda has demonstrated a willingness to compromise to ensure a smooth democratic 
transition.  
Interestingly, throughout the revolution and the transition process, the Tunisian military 
remained outside of politics (Lesch, 2014:67). Under the Revolution it quickly became 
apparent that the police and security forces could not stop the street demonstrations that 
quickly spread throughout the country. As a result, Ben Ali ordered the army´s chief of staff, 
General Rachid Ammar, to supply troops in order to help the regime. General Ammar rejected 
his order, and instead placed the military between Ben Ali´s other security units and the 
protesters (Barany, 2011:27). This essentially saved the revolution and forced Ben Ali into 
exile. Accordingly, when Ben Ali fled, General Ammar became one of the most popular 
figures in Tunisia, and could have expected extensive support if he had taken on a political 
role (The Economist, 2011). However, in the end General Ammar decided to stand down, and 
let the civilian government assume power (Barany, 2011:33). 
Two years after the Constitutional Assembly started its work Tunisia´s new constitution 




Constitution created by a representative democratically elected assembly in the Arab world 
(Marks, 2014:3). Throughout the Constitution writing process, as well as the transition 
process, Ennahda´s leadership have demonstrated both long term planning and pragmatic 
restraint. As mentioned earlier, Ennahda compromised on the issues of Sharia, women´s 
rights, as well as the institutional design of the political system. In contrast to Egypt, all 
political forces in Tunisia were brought under one tent, which allowed them to debate, and 
work together to find a solution that most of the public could agree with and accept (Lesch, 
2014:68).  
 
5.2.3 Does compromises increase the probability of democratization?  
 As a reminder the second hypothesis is as follows:  
“The more the state apparatus and the military are willing to compromise with each other 
after a revolution, the higher the probability of democratization”.  
I argue that the empirical evidence presented above supports H2. The analysis 
conducted on the state apparatus and the military´s willingness to compromise in Egypt and 
Tunisia after a revolution has demonstrated that actors in Tunisia were more willing to 
compromise and accommodate each other than those in Egypt.  Post-revolutionary Egypt has 
been characterized by divides and mistrust, which ultimately led to a lack of cooperation. The 
findings show that although the MB and secular political parties had incentives to cooperate 
with each other in the best interest of a democratic transition, they did not. The MB broke 
their promises vis-à-vis of the opposition, which only created more suspicion and mistrust 
between them. In addition, institutions with remnants of the old regime stayed intact making it 
difficult to achieve a democratic transition. The Egyptian military was also present in the 
political sphere in order to protect their interests. The MB did not form a pro-democratic 
coalition following the parliamentary elections, and instead cooperated with SCAF, the 
interim government, hoping to gain more power. The transition process in Egypt was not 
inclusive, and the MB did not disperse or share their power. In sum, the state apparatus and 
the military in Egypt show any willingness to compromise and cooperate with each other 
following the Arab uprisings. It seems like the institutions were more concerned with their 
own interests than achieving real democratic change.  
The findings show that post-revolutionary Tunisia was characterized by both 




expressed a willingness to collaborate with each other to achieve a successful democratic 
transition. As such, following the elections, Ennahda formed a pro-democratic coalition that 
would work together and share power. Ennahda kept their promises to the opposition, and 
although the process was not without conflict, the party did everything it could to show the 
public as well as its opponents that it was not anti-democratic. Ennahda also compromised on 
several core issues, such as Sharia, women´s rights and the institutional design of Tunisia´s 
political system, all to reach a consensus with their opponents. The old Institutions under Ben 
Ali were also dissolved to create new institutions, and remnants of the old regime were 
removed from power and prosecuted. In addition, even though the Tunisian military could get 
involved in politics, to promote their interests, they stepped aside to let a civilian government 
assume power. Although the transition process in Tunisia was slow, it was an inclusive one, 
which fostered power sharing, cooperation and compromise. In sum, the state apparatus and 
the military in Tunisia has shown a willingness to compromise with each other after the 
revolution, which has in return facilitated, a democratization process.  
 
5.3 Internal Divides between the Ruling Coalition During the Uprisings  
This section will investigate internal divides between the state apparatus and the 
military during the Arab uprisings. Transitional outcomes from authoritarian rule are affected 
by central actors´ belief, preferences, and decisions. As previously shown, transitions often 
start because of important divisions between the ruling elite within the authoritarian regime 
(O´Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:19). Previous research on transitions from authoritarian rule 
claims that the military can play a critical role in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. This 
is because militaries enjoy coercive resources and when willing, can countermand all 
challenges to authoritarian rule (Lee, 2009:640-641). Hence, to answer H3 I will focus on 
whether or not the military defected from the regime. This in return will indicate if an internal 
divide between the ruling coalition in Egypt and Tunisia occurred during the Arab uprisings.   
 
5.3.1 The Egyptian Military: Loyalty or Defection?   
Following the Arab Uprisings, tens of thousands of angry citizens assembled in Tahrir 
Square in Egypt to demand an end to the Mubarrak regime. During the uprising in Egypt, the 




divides between the ruling elite (Heydemann and Leenders, 648). In Egypt´s intricate ruling 
elite, the Egyptian military is one of the central pillars of power and legitimacy. In order to 
maintain the Egyptian military´s loyalty to his regime, Mubarak granted them privileges. This 
allowed them to establish and manage a lucrative military-industrial-business complex, which 
remained untouched (Demmelhuber, 2011). The fact that the Egyptian military´s economic 
interests were deeply tied to the Mubarak regime,  meant that the military had strong reasons 
to be invested in the political status quo in Egypt.  
As the revolution in Egypt unfolded, the regime found itself backed into a corner, and 
the police had difficulty in supressing the masses (Hashim, 2011:116). Mubarak responded by 
sending out military troops, however, many soldiers defended the protesters from aggressive 
police and paramilitary groups (Schneider, 2011: 481). Furthermore, on the 29th of January 
2011, soldiers refused to shoot at the protesters, in a public statement the military declared: 
“The presence of the army in the streets is for your sake and to ensure your safety and 
wellbeing. The armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people." (Black, 
Shenker, and McGreal, 2011).  
 On the 11th of February 2011 it was clear that the military had defected from Mubarak 
as the military ultimately pushed Mubarak out of power, giving him no other alternative than 
to resign from office (Hashim, 2011:106; Schneider, 2011:481). Why did the Egyptian 
military, after decades of the defending the authoritarian regime, refuse to repress the 
protesters and instead force Mubarak to resign? It is difficult to know what exactly went 
through the minds of the military elite when deciding to side with civilian protesters, 
however, when examining the political situation in Egypt I would argue that their decision 
mainly due to the military´s financial interests.  
 This might seem like a strange statement to make, as the Egyptian military´s business 
ventures were blessed and protected by the Egyptian regime, and accounted for a significant 
proportion to its economic privilege (Bellin, 2012:134). However, it was precisely because of 
the military´s own financial interests that the military turned its back on the regime. The 
Egyptian military´s main goal was to protect its privileged role in Egypt (Demmelhuber, 
2011). Moreover, if Mubarak stayed in power, the Egyptian military risked losing important 
assets for several reasons. One of them was related to Mubarak´s son, Gamal Mubarak who 




Gamal who was groomed for the presidency, was mistrusted and disapproved of by the 
military elite (Norton, 2013:338). The military´s mistrust and objection of Gamal Mubarak 
emanated from his connections to a younger generation of ruling party cadres who had 
prospered in the business world. The military on the other hand, was connected to the NDP´s 
old guard, a less wealthy elite that have made their careers as ministers, and officers, and as a 
result military officers were afraid that Gamal would dismantle the military´s institutional 
powers (Cambanis, 2010). Mohamed Kadry Said, a retired general from the Egyptian military 
stated in an interview: “Of course the military has become jealous they are not the only big 
bosses now, they feel threatened by the business community” (Cambanis, 2010). 
From the military´s point of view then, as long as Mubarak stayed in power, the 
military would thrive, however, this would probably change if Gamal took over for Mubarak 
and possibly implement privatization policies, which would in return break up the Egyptian 
military´s business assets, thereby threatening the military´s economy (Nepstad, 2013:342). 
Thus, the Egyptian military had strong economic incentives to side with the protesters over 
the regime because their assets were in fact threatened if the regime collapsed.  
The military also had incentives not to repress the demonstrations as this would have 
ended in a bloodbath, and hurt the military´s reputation, which in return would ruin their 
chances to be able to continue to affect the political system in Egypt (Droz-Vincent, 2011:19). 
If the public disapproves of the military and perceives it as an extension of the regime itself, 
this would be harmful for the Egyptian military’s vital interests. In addition, the military 
wanted to avoid any internal divides between the officer corps, and feared that the rank and 
file members who had some degree of sympathy for the protestors (Droz-Vincent, 2011:19). 
This also affected the military´s decision to defect as a whole and change their support to the 
protesters of Tahrir Square. The fact that the entire institution defected as a whole implied that 
there was no one left in the military to enforce sanctions on defectors (Nepstad, 2013:343).  
Furthermore, another reason, which could possibly have influenced the military´s 
decision to defect from the Mubarak regime, was the US response to the uprisings in Egypt. 
Originally, the Obama administration supported the Mubarrak regime but later changed its 
position by asking for Mubarak to resign (Nepstad, 2013:343). As the Egyptian military 
received roughly 1.3 million dollars annually in aid from the US, they did not want to 
jeopardize the relationship (Richter, 2007: 184). If the military were to side with Mubarak this 




important for the Egyptian military to protect its relationship with the US. As stated by 
Hashim (2011: 118) the US has “[…] provided the Egyptian armed forces with some of the 
most sophisticated weaponry in the world”. Additionally, the annual military aid from the US 
consisted of almost half of the military budget (Demmelhuber, 2011). Hence, if the Egyptian 
military had remained loyal to Mubarak, they could have become subject to further financial 
losses.  
Prior to the uprisings, the power base in Egypt was centralized. Mubarak had 
centralized authority over state institutions under his rule, which made his executive position 
strong. Mubarak had extensive constitutional powers and became the mediator over the elite 
within the state governing organizations (Stacher, 2012:70). Stacher (2012:70) argues that 
“This makes the system highly adaptable, which means that even the chief executive becomes 
dispensable because of its adaptive qualities are so efficient”. The adaptable character of 
Egypt´s centralized executive turned out to be an important aspect of Mubarak´s fall. When 
the regime was threatened, which in return put the military´s interests at risk the Egyptian 
military took action. In order to salvage the regime SCAF forced Mubarak to resign, and 
changed the ruling coalition without jeopardizing the regime as a whole (Stacher, 2012:96). 
This allowed SCAF to assume the central executive position and take control over the 
transition process. The Egyptian military essentially sacrificed Mubarak to save the regime 
thereby securing their own interests. Most of Egypt´s institutions, including the state 
bureaucracy remained unaffected by Mubarak’s removal from office (Norton, 2013:338).  
As the uprising in Egypt demonstrates, the Egyptian military had institutional interests 
separate from the president. Accordingly, the survival of the regime was essentially dependent 
upon the military and its willingness and capacity to contain the political crisis (Bellin, 
2012:130-131). When Mubarak called for the army to act, the military elite weighed their own 
institutional interests against their mission before making any decisions. As it turned out, 
Mubarak became more of a liability to the military as their fundamental interests were 
threatened. As presented above, there were several issues that influenced the military to defect 
form Mubarak´s regime. This was particularly linked to the military´s fundamental corporate 
interests. First and foremost, their financial interests were threatened if Mubarak’s son Gamal 
Mubarak succeeded the presidency. Secondly, the military would not risk losing its financial 
aid from the US by going against the Obama administration. Thirdly, it was not in the 
Egyptian military´s interests to repress protesters as public dissatisfaction could ruin an 




In sum, the Egyptian military assessed the consequences of their loyalty to the regime 
and eventually defected from the regime. The military behaved as a rational actor by 
calculating risks and advantages of supporting Mubarak´s regime or the protesters before 
deciding and acting in a manner, which would ultimately maximize their own interests. The 
Egyptian military was and still remains to this day a central source of power in Egypt. Due to 
the centralization of power in Egypt, it also allowed SCAF to easily remove Mubarak from 
power without endangering the whole regime thereby securing the military´s own interests as 
well as re-establish control over Egyptian society. Since the military defected from the 
regime, this demonstrates that a divide between the state apparatus and the military was 
present during the Arab uprisings.  
 
5.3.2 The Tunisian Military: Loyalty or Defection?  
 On the 12th of January 2011, the protests in Tunisia peaked, and tens of thousands of 
Tunisians protested in the Tunisian capital, filling the streets of Habib Bourguiba Avenue 
(Brooks, 2013:205). The situation was getting out of control as Ben Ali´s police and security 
forces were incapable of repressing the protesters as well as protect the regime. Subsequently, 
Ben Ali deployed the military to the Tunisian capital, Tunis. This highlighted the severity of 
the situation, as the Tunisian military has historically not had any role affiliated with 
patrolling the capital or protecting national security. Moreover, Ben Ali had reportedly 
ordered the Tunisian military to use force against the protesters. However, similar to the 
Egyptian military, the Tunisian military refused to comply with the regimes´ wished (Gelvin, 
2012:60).  
 Contrary to Egypt, the Tunisian military´s decision to defect was less surprising. The 
Tunisian military is the smallest in the Arab word. It is widely recognized for having a 
professional, small and isolated from Tunisian politics (Bellin, 2012:133-134). Although the 
Tunisian military is small in size and did not partake in founding the new regime in Tunisia 
following their independence in 1956 as its Egyptian counterparts, it is still regarded as a 
symbol of the state (Droz-Vincent, 2011:18). The Tunisian military has not fought in any 
major war, and for the most part remained in the barracks. Contrary to its Egyptian 
counterparts, the Tunisian military never established any deep corporate interests that would 
make them invested in Ben Ali´s regime and its survival (Grewal, 2016). Hence, the Tunisian 




At the centre of the decision to defect from Ben Ali´s regime was the Tunisian 
military´s chief of staff, General Rachid Ammar. General Ammar did not only reject Ben 
Ali´s order but also placed the military between Ben Ali´s other security forces and the 
protesters (Barany, 2011:27). The Tunisian military were observed withdrawing from the 
Tunisian capital on the 13th of January (Kirkpatrick, 2011). Many viewed the fact that the 
military pulled out of the capital as a sign of the military´s unwillingness to repress protesters. 
However, the Tunisian military troops returned to the streets the very next day following Ben 
Ali´s ouster.  In a YouTube clip from the 24th of January 2011 General Ammar addressed the 
Tunisian people, and declared that, “The army is the guarantor of the revolution”  (YouTube, 
2011). Why did the Tunisian military decide to refrain from violently repressing protests, and 
defect from the Ben Ali regime?  
When examining the political climate in Tunisia, the Tunisian military´s decision to 
defy Ben Ali´s orders, and abandon his regime was primarily because the army had little to 
lose by Ben Ali´s fall. In addition there would be significant costs if the military decided to 
protect him. In fact, the Tunisian military had potentially more to win by Ben Ali´s removal 
from office. For the Tunisian military there were not many advantages with maintaining Ben 
Ali or his regime in power. Ben Ali´s regime had increasingly become more personalist and 
corrupted, which was a liability for the Tunisian military as it undermined their core 
organizational interests (Brooks, 2013:207). As Brooks (2013:207) argues “The reasons for 
its lack of incentives to defend the regime originate in the nature of civil-military relations 
and the mechanisms through which Ben Ali maintained political control of his military, in 
combination with features of the uprisings itself ”.   
As previously mentioned, Ben Ali distanced the military from the regime, limited its 
responsibility, resources and influence. Instead, Ben Ali invested in security forces that 
executed the coercive duties of the regime. This limited the stake the military and its leaders 
had in maintaining Ben Ali in power. Additionally, because Ben Ali excluded the military 
from security roles by allocating most of it to the police and other security forces, Tunisian 
citizens did not associate the Tunisian military with the oppressive security apparatus. This 
created an important opportunity for the military by taking advantage of the situation and 
improving its position and influence in Tunisia by refraining from using lethal force. This 
way, the military could avoid the distaste Tunisians felt towards the police and security forces 




Another important aspect that could have influenced the Tunisian military´s decision 
to defect from the Ben Ali regime was its relationship with the US. Although it is more 
limited than it was in Egypt, Tunisia has a long tradition of military relations with the US. A 
joint US-Tunisian Military Commission meets on an annual basis where joint exercises are 
held regularly (Arieff, 2012:316). The Tunisian Military also received advantages in military 
assistance from the US from Foreign Military Financing (FMF) as well as International 
Military Education and Training (IMET). In 2011 this added up to approximately 17 million 
and 1.7 million dollars. This was beneficial to the Tunisian military as Ben Ali deprived them 
of resources, and hence they relied on limited funds to maintain its aging equipment (Brooks: 
2013:214).  
Moreover, the interaction between the Tunisian military´s and the US military helped 
sustain a corporate ideology where the Tunisian military viewed itself as professional experts 
that placed great value on preserving its organizational integrity (Brooks, 2013:208; 214-15). 
Hence, the decision made by the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime can be 
partly understood in light of the cost for the military by having to jeopardize its organizational 
integrity, and prestige by firing on Tunisian protesters. The Tunisian military viewed 
repression as a threat to its organizational integrity, which could result in losing its prestige 
and social esteem (Brooks, 2013:217). Hence, defection from the incumbent regime would be 
more advantageous to the military as their corporate interests would be accomplished by 
siding with the protesters.    
Similar to the case of Egypt, the uprisings in Tunisia demonstrates that the Tunisian 
military were first and foremost primarily concerned with the organization´s own institutional 
interests. Moreover, when Ben Ali called upon the military to supressed the protesters through 
the use of lethal force, the Tunisian military acted by refusing to follow his orders and 
eventually siding with the protesters. Similar to the Egyptian military then, the Tunisian 
military weighed the potential advantages and disadvantages of sustaining Ben Ali and his 
regime. As it turned out, the Tunisian military had little to lose in Ben Ali´s removal from 
office, as Ben Ali marginalized the Tunisian military from roles in state institutions, and 
limited the organizations access to resources. This in returned, reduced the Tunisian military´s 
investment in the Ben Ali regime. In addition, the cost that the Tunisian military would be 
subjected to by following Ben Ali´s orders to supress forcefully the demonstrators would go 




  To summarize, the issues that influenced the Tunisian military´s decision to defect 
from Ben Ali´s regime was essentially because of the political climate under Ben Ali. The 
Tunisian military had been excluded from Ben Ali´s regime, which had also limited their 
resources. Hence, there was a lack of incentives to protect the regime, and the military would 
face significant costs if they were to engage in the form of mass repression necessary to 
defend the regime. The Tunisian military also had potentially more to gain by Ben Ali being 
ousted as it did not benefit from its positioning within the regime. Thus, because the Tunisian 
regime had little to gain by helping Ben Ali, and much more to lose, it decided instead to side 
with the protesters under the uprisings. The Tunisian military essentially acted as a rational 
actor by choosing the option that would maximize their interests. For the Tunisian military, 
this was siding with the protesters.  As was the case in Egypt, the Tunisian military defected 
from the regime, which indicates an internal divide between the state apparatus and the 
military in Tunisia during the Arab uprisings.  
 
5.3.5 Does divides among the ruling elite increase the probability of democratization?  
The third hypothesis is the following: 
 “The more divided the state apparatus and the military are during a revolution, the higher 
the probability of democratization.” 
 I would argue that the evidence presented above does not support H3. The analysis on 
divisions between the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and Tunisia has demonstrated 
that in both cases the military defected from the state apparatus. This has highlighted that an 
internal divide within the ruling coalition occurred during the Arab uprisings. In both 
instances, the military facilitated the beginning of the transition by defecting from the regime. 
For this reason, I contend that this does not explain why Tunisia democratized while Egypt 
returned to an authoritarian regime following the Arab uprisings. Furthermore, the military 
defection in both Egypt and Tunisia also indicates that the internal divides between the state 
apparatus and the military was due to disagreements between hard-liners and soft-liners 
within the ruling bloc over how to handle the Arab uprisings. In Egypt and Tunisia, the 
military´s decision to defect suggests that they realized there was a need to grant some 
freedoms or some form of change. The state apparatus, which included Mubarak in Egypt and 
Ben Ali in Tunisia, on the other hand believed that the regimes structures, and coercion was 




carefully weighing their options before deciding on the alternative that would be of most 
advantage to them. Although the evidence does not account for the different outcomes 
between Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings, this analysis has demonstrated the 



























Chapter 6: Discussion of Results 
This chapter discusses the main finding of the empirical analysis presented in chapter 
5, and is divided into three sections, where the first section discusses the main findings of the 
hypotheses. Accordingly, a table has been developed to provide the reader with a brief 
summary of the main findings in Egypt and Tunisia. The second section discusses what the 
findings mean in relation to the democratization process. Finally, the last section consists of a 
discussion of the theoretical framework against the findings.   
6.1 Why Egypt´s Revolution Failed, and Tunisia´s Revolution Succeeded  
Table 1: A brief summary of the main findings in Egypt and Tunisia  
Hypothesis Causal Process 
Observations in Egypt 
Causal Process 
Observations in Tunisia  
Support of hypothesis 
H1: The more 
autonomous the state 
apparatus and the military 
are from each other, in an 
authoritarian regime, the 
higher the probability of 
democratization.  
-The military owns a vast 
portion of Egypt´s 
commercial and 
industrial sectors. 
-The military was part of 
the state apparatus.  
- The military and state 
apparatus were not 
autonomous of each 
other. 
- The military did not 
own any businesses or 
dominate the domestic 
economy.  
- The military and the 
state apparatus were kept 
separate, and 
subsequently autonomous 
of each other. 
 
Yes.  
H2: The more the state 
apparatus and the military 
are willing to 
compromise with each 
other after a revolution, 
the higher the probability 
of democratization.  
-Remnants from 
Mubarak´s regime were 
not removed.  
 
- No pro-democratic 
coalition formed.  
 
-The MB broke its 
promises to the political 
opposition, and was not 
willing to compromise 
with them.  
 
- The MB collaborated 
with SCAF 
- Remnants of Ben Ali´s 
regime were removed. 
 




with the opposition on 
several issues, including 
sharia, women´s rights, 
and the institutional 
design of the political 
system.  
 
- The military remained 
outside of politics. 
Yes.  
H3: The more divided the 
state apparatus and the 
military are during a 
revolution, the higher the 
probability of 
democratization.   
- The military did not 
follow Mubarak´s orders 
to shoot protesters.  
 
- The military defected 
from the Mubarak regime 
to protect their own 
interests.  
 
- The military´s interests 
were separate from 
Mubarak and his regime.  
- The military did not 
follow Ben Ali´s orders 
to shoot protesters.  
 
-The military defected 
from the Ben Ali regime 
because of a lack of 
incentives to save the 






Despite the Egyptian and Tunisian cases having similar authoritarian regimes, they 
differed on one key aspect, namely the strength and influence of the military. As table 1 
demonstrates, the processes leading up to the different transitional outcomes in Egypt and 
Tunisia were quite different as a result of this. When looking at H1 the results indicates that 
the relationship between the state apparatus and the military institution were very different. In 
Egypt, the military played a dominating role since Nasser and the Free Officers carried out a 
military coup against the ruling monarchy. The Egyptian military helped establish the 
authoritarian regime, and as a result, were able to influence and help found a political system 
that privileged them. By contrast, the Tunisian military did not help establish the authoritarian 
regime, or have any important role in the regime´s founding. When Bourguiba assumed 
power he ensured that the Tunisian military would play a limited role in politics, which was a 
strategy that Ben Ali continued with when he assumed power. Under both Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali, military officers were banned from politics, and were kept small in terms of size and 
resources. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that in the Egyptian case, the relationship 
between the state apparatus and the military was one of mutual dependence, and 
accommodation. The Egyptian military was part of the authoritarian regime in Egypt since it’s 
founding, and had considerable influence over the state. As a result the state apparatus and the 
Egyptian military were not autonomous from each another. In the Tunisian case on the other 
hand, the findings of the analysis indicates a stark contrast. The relationship between the state 
apparatus and the military was independent. The Tunisian military was kept at a distance from 
the regime since its inception, and did not have any influence over the state.  
The findings in H1 illustrate a difference in relation to the Egyptian and the Tunisian 
military´s influence over their respective countries economy. In Tunisia, the military did not 
own any businesses, and were essentially excluded from the economic sector by the regime. 
This is a significant contrast to the Egyptian case, where the military not only owned a big 
portion of Egypt´s commercial and industrial sectors, but also had decisive influence over the 
economic policies put forth by the Egyptian regime. The difference between the Egyptian and 
Tunisian case, lies in the different strategy pursued by the authoritarian regimes. In Egypt, 
Mubarak and his predecessors protected the military´s interests and gave them privileges, 
which consisted of awarding the military with direct and indirect economic privileges. This in 
return ensured the Egyptian military´s protection, loyalty and allegiance to the regime. The 
Tunisian regime´s strategy on the other hand was different in that it marginalized and 




Ben Ali and his predecessor, Bourguiba based the coercive power on security and intelligence 
organizations. Accordingly, in the Egyptian case, the military institution was integrated into 
the Egyptian economy whereas in the Tunisian case, the military institution was excluded 
from the economic sector.  
The main findings for H2 in table 1, indicates a stark contrast in the willingness to 
compromise between the state apparatus and the military following the Arab uprisings. After 
the revolution, which resulted in Ben Ali´s ouster, the remnants of his regime were removed. 
The old institutions were dissolved under the authoritarian regime, and replaced by new 
institution. This facilitated the transition process in Tunisia because there were no remnants of 
the old regime present to obstruct it. The exact opposite occurred in Egypt. Following 
Mubarak´s removal from office, SCAF took over as the interim government, and as a result, 
the old institutions remained intact, and no new institutional reforms occurred. In addition 
most of the political power still remained with the old remnants of the regime, which 
successfully managed to create mistrust and divide among the opposition.  
Egypt and Tunisia opted for different paths during the transition process. Egypt started 
with the legislative election, followed by the presidential elections, and finally an assembly 
elected by the legislature drafted a new constitution. By contrast, Tunisia started by electing a 
constituent assembly that would form the government and write a new constitution. The 
legislative election came last (Lesch: 2014:68). Following Ennahda winning the majority in 
the election of the constituent assembly, the party formed a three party pro-democratic 
coalition with CPR and Ettakatol. Ennahda did everything in its power to reassure the 
opposition of its commitment to a democratic transition, and subsequently compromised on 
various issues with its opponents such sharia, women´s rights and the institutional design of 
the political system. The MB on the other hand, was not pragmatic nor was the party willing 
to compromise with the opposition. Consequently, the transition process in Egypt was 
characterized by extreme polarization and mistrust. At the beginning of the transition process, 
the MB promised the opposition not to seek parliamentary majority, not to dominate the 
constitutional assembly or have a candidate run for the presidency, but nevertheless, broke all 
these promises, which prevented any meaningful consensus building. In other words, the MB 
essentially dominated the political dialogue in Egypt, while the secular parties were 
marginalized and alienated. Instead of compromising and collaborating with the opposition 




end. This is very different for the transition process in Tunisia where all political forces were 
brought under one tent to reach a compromise, and find solutions that everyone could accept.  
 An important aspect of the state apparatus and the military´s willingness to 
compromise following the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia is related to their autonomy. As 
previously mentioned, the Tunisian military and the state apparatus were kept separate from 
each other, which have impacted the transition in a positive manner. In Egypt on the other 
hand, the military and the state apparatus were essentially fused together, which has had a 
negative impact on the transition in Egypt. The autonomy between institutions in Tunisia 
facilitated the ability to dissolve old institutions, and create new ones. In addition, the military 
had no economic or political interests that were threatened by a democratic transition, and 
played no political role in the transition process. This in return, made room for the political 
elite, which allowed them to take control over the transition process, and find solutions. 
Unlike Tunisia, the transition in Egypt did not only threaten Mubarak and his regime, but  
also the economic and political privileges of the Egyptian military. As a result, old institutions 
remained and the military played a political role in the transition. Moreover, the remnants of 
Mubarak´s regime and the Egyptian military used a “divide and rule” strategy on the MB and 
the secular opposition. This fostered suspicion and mistrust between them, and essentially 
made them unwilling to collaborate and compromise with each other.  
 The main findings for H3 in table 1 have revealed a close similarity between the two 
cases in relation to the internal divide between the state apparatus and the military. In both 
instances, a division between the state apparatus and the military occurred. When Mubarak 
and Ben Ali ordered the military to shoot the protesters the militaries refused to follow orders, 
and eventually defected from the regime. Before defecting from the regimes, both the 
Egyptian and the Tunisian military weighed their own institutional interests against the 
interest of the authoritarian regime. In the end, both the Egyptian and Tunisian military 
decided to defect from the Mubarak and Ben Ali regime in order to protect their own 
interests. The Tunisian military was excluded by the regime both politically and 
economically, which meant that they could potentially gain more by Ben Ali´s ouster. A 
democratic transition in Tunisia could improve its position and influence in Tunisian society. 
Hence, the Tunisian military lacked incentives to save the regime because it did not own any 
businesses, and was marginalized by the regime. The Egyptian military on the other hand, 
were invested in the status quo, as they were not only included in the regime, their businesses 




financial interests, as a result they sacrificed Mubarak to save the regime, and thus, securing 
their own financial interests.  
Moreover, I would argue that because the division between the state apparatus and the 
military occurred in both cases, this does not explain Egypt and Tunisia ´s different 
transitions. Accordingly, the findings indicate that explanatory power lies in H1 and H2. 
Hence, the autonomy between the state apparatus, and the military, as well as these 
institutions willingness to compromise account for the variations between Egypt and Tunisia 
following the Arab uprisings in 2011. 
 
6.2 What does the findings mean to the democratization process?  
The research question that this thesis has attempted to answer is the following: “Why 
did Tunisia result in democratization while Egypt did not, when they both appear to have 
similar authoritarian regimes?” Subsequently, the findings suggest that the difference in 
Egypt and Tunisia´s transitions lie in the influence of the military in relation to the state 
apparatus. The transition process in both cases was very different, in Tunisia the military kept 
out of the transition while in Egypt, the military kept the transition under control. In Egypt, 
the military were a part of the authoritarian regime, and had the most to lose from a 
democratic transition, whereas in Tunisia the military had been marginalized, and had more to 
gain by a democratic transition. Moreover, the Tunisian military returned to the barracks after 
the start of the transition whereas the Egyptian military remained behind the scenes, even 
after the FJP had secured the parliamentary and presidential elections.  
  I would argue that because Egypt´s state apparatus and military were not autonomous 
of each other, and instead merged together, the Egyptian institutions were weakened. This in 
return, made them ineffective in supporting reform when the transition was initiated. On the 
other hand, because the state apparatus and the military in Tunisia were autonomous the 
institutions were stronger, which made them effective in supporting reform once the transition 
process started. As a result, Tunisia was therefore able to take imperative steps towards 
altering political and administrative system, while in Egypt the necessary steps towards 
changing the political and administrative systems were hindered by SCAF. Furthermore, 
because Tunisia was so successful in ridding itself of the remnants of the old regime, and, this 




compromise in order to find long term solutions that everyone could accept. In Egypt, the 
exact opposite happened, as the remnants of the old regime remained, no institutional reforms 
occurred, and the institutions under the authoritarian regime remained intact. The 
consequence of this was that the MB and the secular/liberal parties did not trust one another, 
and instead competed to collaborate with SCAF.   
In summary, the causal mechanisms that explain why Tunisia experienced a democratic 
transition following the Arab uprisings in 2011 are the following. First, the Tunisian military 
did not have any influence over the state apparatus. They were not a part of the regime, and 
were marginalized both politically and economically by Ben Ali prior to the uprisings.  
Subsequently, the state apparatus and the military were autonomous of each other, and as a 
result the institutions were robust enough to uphold reforms once the transition was initiated. 
Second, the Tunisian military quickly returned to the barracks after the start of the transition, 
which allowed a civilian government take over power. Third, because the state apparatus and 
the military were autonomous, the political forces in Tunisia could more effectively remove 
remnants as well as old institutions from the authoritarian regime and put in place new 
institutions, thereby changing the political and administrative system in Tunisia. Finally, the 
political forces in Tunisia were all forced together to debate face to face, which facilitated 
dialogue and compromise between them. This resulted in them working for solutions that 
everyone, including the public could accept.  
 The transition process in Egypt was more or less opposite than Tunisia. The causal 
mechanisms that explain why Egypt´s transition reverted back to an authoritarian regime 
following the Arab uprisings are the following. First, the Egyptian military was included in 
the regime, and had considerable influence over the state apparatus. The Egyptian military 
also owned extensive businesses, making them invested in the regime status quo.  The state 
apparatus and the military were merged together and not autonomous, and as a result the 
institutions were incapable to uphold reforms once the transition was started. Second, the 
Egyptian military took control over the transition soon after it started. Third, as a result of 
SCAF taking over as the interim government, the institutions and the remnants of the old 
regime remained, and hence, no changes were made in the political and administrative system 
in Egypt. SCAF worked tirelessly behind the scenes with the remnants of the old regime to pit 
the other political forces against each other. Finally, the consequence of this was that the MB 
and the secular/liberal parties lacked trust in each other. The MB and Islamic politicians were 




opposition and compromising with them to find solutions, the latter collaborated with the 
Egyptian military instead, which eventually removed them from power in a military coup.   
 
6.3 Theoretical discussion  
This thesis has utilized two different theoretical approaches, which was the new 
institutionalist approach and rational choice theory. Furthermore, three hypotheses were 
developed from the basis of the theoretical framework, where the first two derived from the 
new institutional approach, and the last on was developed from rational choice theory. 
Subsequently, the following section discusses the main findings in relation to the theories.  
 
6.3.1 New Institutionalism: Sociological institutionalist approach  
As a reminder, the sociological approach within the new institutionalist framework 
essentially argues that institutions count the institutional structure of regimes constitutes a 
crucial difference for their outcomes. Accordingly, the theory holds that institutions do count 
in surviving crisis because they manage to retain their own positions and are essential in 
determining whether a transition occurs, and the route it will take (Battera: 2014:546). The 
new institutional approach also holds that actors are formed according to the institutional 
context from which they live, and the interests of institutions reflect historical legacies, as 
well as national interests.  
My findings support the new institutional approach. The institutional configuration of 
the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and Tunisia was very different. The state 
apparatus and the military in Egypt were not autonomous of each other, and as a result the 
institutions in Egypt were weaker than in Tunisia, and were thus ineffective during the 
transition.  By contrast, in Tunisia, the state apparatus and the military were autonomous; the 
institutions were robust, and thus powerful enough to support new reforms during the 
transition. As the findings demonstrate, the structure and relationship between institutions are 
essential factors that influence the directions transitions will take.  Moreover, as findings 
demonstrate, the state apparatus and the military in Egypt and Tunisia have mirrored the 
historical legacies in the respective countries. In Tunisia, the military were marginalized and 
kept separate from the state apparatus from the outset, whereas in Egypt, the military has ever 




history of dominating state institutions. This in return has influenced their institutional 
interests, and position with Egypt and Tunisia.  
  
6.3.2 New Institutionalism: Historical institutionalist approach  
 Historical Institutionalism essentially argues that institutional choices made in the past 
can endure, and consequently influence and constrain actors in the future. Subsequently, for 
this perspective institutions are considered to be difficult to change. Path dependency is 
related largely related to historical institutionalist perspective, which basically holds that once 
a country has started on one path, it will be very difficult change course. As Levi (1997:28) 
argues “(…) there will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct easy reversal of the initial choice.” Hence, according to Levi, it is 
possible to change path, however it can be very difficult.  
 My findings also support the historical institutionalist approach, as the institutional 
choices made following Egypt and Tunisia´s independence has been considerably different. 
Ever since the Free Officers helped Nasser come to power in 1952, they have had a long 
history of being privileged in a way that the Tunisian military never were. The Egyptian 
military has had the seat at the table in the regime, and has had considerable influence over 
Egyptian politics. The Tunisian military on the other hand, had a diminished role in Tunisian 
society under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali. The Tunisian military were much weaker than its 
Egyptian counterparts, and had almost no access to resources. In addition, contrary to the 
Egyptian military it had never backed a coup or initiated a revolution against the state. Hence, 
from the outset, the institutional structure of the Egyptian military was set up in a manner 
where they had considerable power and influence whereas the Tunisian military´s was kept 
separate from the state from the outset. The composition of the military´s structure is thus 
reflected in the events following the uprisings where in Egypt for instance, the same 
structures endured and constrained the political forces ability to change them. As a result of 
this, SCAF took over as interim government to protect the regime following the uprisings, and 
the old institutions remained. However, because the Tunisian military had no history of being 
a part of the regime, it remained outside of the political aspect of the transition, which in 
return made it easier for the political forces involved in the transition process to dissolve old 





6.3.3 Rational Choice Theory 
RCT holds that actors are rational, and behaves accordingly. Subsequently, the theory 
argues that individuals are driven by goals and desires, which is reflected in their preferences. 
The actor has information on available alternatives, and will chose the alternative with the 
highest expected advantage. The framework of RCT can be applied to the ruling elite within 
authoritarian regimes under political crises. The ruling elite can be separated into hard-liners 
and soft-liners. Moreover, transitions from authoritarian rule usually occur when these two 
groups disagree on how to handle a political crisis. Hard-liners believe that the authoritarian 
regime´s current political structures, and coercion will be sufficient for the regime to survive 
the crisis. Soft-liners on the other hand, believe that the regime needs to grant some freedoms 
or else it will be vulnerable to popular overthrow.  
Although my findings support the RCT to a certain degree, they do not sufficiently 
support the last hypothesis. This is because a divide occurred between the state apparatus and 
the military during the Arab uprisings in both the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, and 
subsequently this does not account for their different outcomes. The findings have displayed 
that both the Egyptian and Tunisian military defected from the regime during the Arab 
uprisings because this proved to be the alternative with the most advantage. Thus, both the 
Egyptian and Tunisian military acted as rational actors that weighed the alternatives available 
to them carefully before choosing the alternative with the highest expected advantage to them. 
The cost of repressing protesters was higher, than the advantages with maintaining the status 
quo. The military defection suggests an internal divide was present between the hard-liners 
and soft-liners within the regime due to disagreement between them on how to handle the 
Arab uprisings. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia this was between the military and the state 
apparatus. In Egypt, Mubarak increasingly became a liability to the regime, and the military 
had the most to lose with the regime´s fall. Accordingly, they refused to follow his orders to 
use lethal force on protesters and forced him to step down to attempt to save the rest of the 
regime. By comparison, the Tunisian military also refused to follow Ben Ali´s orders to use 
lethal force on protesters, which ultimately forced Ben Ali to flee. The Tunisian military had 
more to gain by a democratic transition. Hence, in both cases the military realized that their 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Through the use of comparative historical analysis and process tracing, this thesis has 
attempted to explain why Egypt and Tunisia experienced different outcomes following the 
Arab uprisings in 2011. By applying the theoretical framework of new institutionalism and 
rational choice, three hypotheses have been developed to serve as possible explanations for 
Egypt and Tunisia´s different outcomes. The hypotheses were explored and analysed through 
primary and secondary source data material. I considered the following research question:  
“Why did Tunisia result in democratization while Egypt did not, when they both 
appear to have similar authoritarian regimes?”  
The findings indicate that the different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia can be 
explained in the weight of the military in relation to the state apparatus. The Egyptian military 
formed the core of the ruling elite in Egypt and maintained a privileged position, both 
politically and economically. Subsequently, the state apparatus and the military in Egypt were 
not autonomous, and instead merged into each other. By contrast, in Tunisia the state 
apparatus and the military were clearly kept separate, and the Tunisian military were 
marginalized both politically and economically by the regime. Hence, out of the Tunisian and 
the Egyptian military, the latter had the most to lose from a regime change. Furthermore, this 
was reflected in the transition process in the two cases. In Tunisia the military returned to the 
barracks after the transition was initiated whereas in Egypt, the military kept the transition 
under their control.   
 Moreover, because of the lack of autonomy between the state apparatus and the 
military in Egypt, the institutions were weakened, and as a result it became difficult to enforce 
real political change. SCAF took over as the interim government in order to save the regime 
to secure the military´s interests. Consequently, the remnants of the old regime remained, 
which worked against the opponents of the regime. This created divide and mistrust between 
the MB and the seculars, and instead of working together they attempted to cooperate with the 
SCAF and old regime. Hence, due to a lack of autonomy between the state apparatus and the 
military in Egypt, a democratic transition became impossible. The polar opposite occurred in 
Tunisia exactly because the state apparatus and the military were autonomous. Therefore, the 
institutions were much more robust, making them able to enforce political change. As a result, 
institutions from the old regime were dissolved and new ones were established. In addition, 




differences aside to find long-term solutions. This not only facilitated the transition in 
Tunisia, but also enhanced the likelihood of a stable outcome. Furthermore, in both cases the 
state apparatus and the military were divided as the military in Egypt and Tunisia defected 
from the regime. This facilitated the start of the transition in both cases; however, as this was 
the case in both Egypt and Tunisia this is not a satisfactory explanation for their different 
outcomes.    
 
7.1 Implications and Further Research  
	   The research conducted has several implications. First and foremost it has shown the 
importance of institutional autonomy in relation to democratization through the new 
institutional approach. Institutions do count during the event of a crisis, and particularly in 
determining the direction a transition will take. As the cases of Egypt and Tunisia has 
illustrated, the weight and influence of the military in relation to state institutions is a crucial 
factor that determines the outcome of a transition. When institutions are merged together the 
probability of a democratic transition decreases. Hence, the new institutional approach is very 
useful framework useful and can be applied to other cases that are undergoing or have gone 
through a political transition.   
 Second, the research has highlighted that the success in removing remnants, and 
institutions of the old regime is a critical component for a democratic transition to take place.   
In Tunisia, institutions under the old regime were dissolved, and the remnants of the old 
regime were removed. Consequently, this facilitated political forces ability to compromise 
and cooperate with each other. However, in Egypt, the old institutions remained and so did 
the remnants, which created divide and mistrust between the MB and secular regime 
opponents. As a result, no compromises were reached. Hence, this affected the transition 
process in Egypt and Tunisia in different ways.  
There are other areas that this study has not considered due to decisions made in the 
research process. This study has primarily focused on internal factors, which has affected the 
different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia following the Arab uprisings.  However, external 
factors such as international climate or international politics could be just as important, and 
for this reason it would be interesting to investigate how external factors have influenced the 




base the study on other cases to see if the findings apply to these cases as well. As this study 
has focused the transitional outcomes of two Arab republics, another possible area to explore 
could be the Arab monarchies as these proved to be resilient in the wake of the Arab uprising 
(Yom and Gause, 2012:74). Furthermore, it would be very interesting to apply the new 
institutional framework to the Arab monarchies. 
 The research conducted has been limited in three ways. Firstly, the data material, 
which the analysis is based upon, consists primary of secondary source material. However, 
primary source material is difficult to obtain as the military, particularly in Egypt are quite 
secretive. As such, there is not a lot of primary source material available on the military or 
state apparatus. Secondly, I was not allowed to travel to Egypt by the University to conduct 
interviews because of possible dangers. However, I could have travelled to Tunisia although I 
would argue that the research would then not be sufficiently representative.  Thirdly, I could 
have included more cases to this study.  Additional cases could possibly have strengthened 
the findings of this thesis, thereby making the findings more applicable and allow for a greater 
generalizability. As I have conducted a small-N study, the study is limited because of it only 
considers two cases, and thus the findings may not be representative of other cases.    
	   Despite some limitations with the research conducted in this thesis, the study has 
provided important insights into democratization prospects in the MENA region. The study 
has demonstrated that both institutions and actors´ interests and interactions do count when a 
transition occurs. In particular, the study has highlighted that the military´s power and 
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